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Chevron’s Inevitability
Nicholas R. Bednar*
Kristin E. Hickman**
ABSTRACT
For over thirty years, Chevron deference has been the target of criticism.
Now, some judges and legislators are calling for an end to Chevron, and legal
scholars are heralding the doctrine’s retreat. Chevron may be evolving, as
common law often does. But claims that Chevron is in decline are overblown,
and efforts to overturn Chevron in any meaningful sense are misdirected.
Chevron-style deference is inevitable in the modern administrative state. The
real “problem”—to the extent one sees it as such—is not Chevron but rather
unhappiness with the natural consequences of congressional reliance on agencies to resolve major policy issues.
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“Faithless is he that says farewell when the road
darkens,” . . . .
“Maybe, . . . but let him not vow to walk in the dark, who
has not seen the nightfall.”
—J.R.R. Tolkien1
INTRODUCTION
Is the mighty Chevron deference on the wane? Maybe. Several
legal scholars seem to think so.2 But what does that mean, what would
that look like, and what really would that accomplish?
The Chevron standard of judicial review—with its two-part test
mandating judicial deference to reasonable agency interpretations of
ambiguous statutes, derived from the Supreme Court’s 1984 decision
in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.3—
has dominated discussions of American administrative law for a generation and continues to do so.4 Chevron has been dissected, debated,
1

J.R.R. TOLKIEN, THE FELLOWSHIP

OF THE

RING 274 (1954).

See, e.g., Lisa Heinzerling, The Power Canons, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1933, 1937–38
(2017) (suggesting the Chevron standard has been “oust[ed]” by “a new trio of canons of statutory interpretation”); Michael Herz, Chevron Is Dead; Long Live Chevron, 115 COLUM. L. REV.
1867, 1868 (2015) (describing Chevron’s “condition” as “if not terminal, at least serious”); Catherine M. Sharkey, In the Wake of Chevron’s Retreat 1–3 (June 2, 2016) (unpublished manuscript),
https://administrativestate.gmu.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/29/2016/06/Sharkey_In-the-Wakeof-Chevron_5_20_16.pdf (cited with permission) (exploring Chevron’s “retreat”).
2

3 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984). Speaking loosely, the Chevron standard requires a reviewing court to consider whether the meaning of the statute at issue is clear, and if it is not, then to
defer to the administering agency’s permissible or reasonable interpretation thereof. Id. For a
substantially lengthier examination of the Chevron Court’s description of this two-step mode,
see infra Section II.A.
4 1 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 158 (5th ed. 2010) (describing Chevron as “one of the most important decisions in the history of administrative law”).

R
R
R
R
R
R
R
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and applied more than any other canonical administrative law case5:
more than State Farm6 or Vermont Yankee;7 more than Goldberg v.
Kelly8 or Mathews v. Eldridge;9 more even than all of Overton Park,10
Abbott Labs,11 Chenery I,12 and Chenery II13 taken together.14 Only
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife15 even comes close.16

5 According to Westlaw, Chevron had been cited more than 81,000 times, including
roughly 15,100 cases and 11,000 law review articles, as of June 2017.
6 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29
(1983) (holding that agencies must contemporaneously justify their policy choices). According to
Westlaw, State Farm had been cited more than 27,000 times, including roughly 5,400 cases and
2,400 law review articles, as of June 2017.
7 Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978)
(holding that courts may not impose procedural requirements beyond those required by statute,
by agency rule, or by the Constitution). According to Westlaw, Vermont Yankee had been cited
more than 12,000 times, including roughly 1,700 cases and 1,600 law review articles, as of June
2017.
8 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (holding that welfare benefits are a protected interest under the
Due Process Clause and laying the foundation for modern due process analysis). According to
Westlaw, Goldberg v. Kelly had been cited approximately 19,700 times, including roughly 4,800
cases and 3,300 law review articles, as of June 2017.
9 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (establishing the modern three-part standard for evaluating whether
the Due Process Clause requires agencies to follow additional procedures before depriving parties of protected interests). According to Westlaw, Mathews v. Eldridge had been cited roughly
45,500 times, including approximately 13,000 cases and 4,800 law review articles, as of June 2017.
10 Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971) (holding that an
agency must provide an administrative record in support of its actions to facilitate judicial
review).
11 Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967) (recognizing that the Administrative Procedure Act creates a presumption favoring reviewability of agency action and creating the contemporary two-part standard for evaluating whether agency action is ripe for judicial review).
12 SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery I), 318 U.S. 80 (1943) (holding that reviewing courts
must evaluate agency actions based on contemporaneously established justifications rather than
post hoc rationalizations).
13 SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery II), 332 U.S. 194 (1947) (holding that where Congress
authorizes an agency to act through both rulemaking and adjudication, the choice between those
formats is a matter of agency discretion).
14 According to Westlaw, these four canonical administrative law cases collectively had
been cited approximately 52,600 times, including roughly 16,100 cases and 4,200 law review articles, as of June 2017.
15

504 U.S. 555 (1992) (establishing the modern three-part test for constitutional standing).

According to Westlaw, although Defenders of Wildlife had been cited roughly 65,200
times overall, including in 3,700 law review articles, as of June 2017, which was substantially less
than Chevron, it had been cited in roughly 17,600 cases as of that time, which was slightly more
often than Chevron. Chevron predates Defenders of Wildlife by several years.
16
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But, although scholarly analysis of Chevron continues apace17 and
judicial reliance on Chevron remains more or less constant,18 Chevron
is under attack and thus, arguably, on the decline. In Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n,19 Justice Scalia—long one of Chevron’s greatest
proponents—acknowledged that Chevron “did not comport with” the
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”)20 and that the Court was
“[h]eedless of the original design of the APA” in developing its deference jurisprudence.21 Shortly thereafter, in Michigan v. EPA,22 Justice
Thomas contended that “Chevron deference raises serious separationof-powers questions” and urged the Court to “stop to consider [the
Constitution] before blithely giving the force of law to any other
agency ‘interpretations’ of federal statutes.”23 Justice Neil Gorsuch, as
a circuit court judge, advocated abandoning Chevron, characterizing it
as “permit[ting] all too easy intrusions on the liberty of the people,”24
though he grudgingly conceded that Chevron alone is not quite “the
very definition of tyranny.”25 The House of Representatives has
passed two separate versions of the Separation of Powers Restoration
Act (“SOPRA”),26 which purports to overturn Chevron by amending
17 For just a few of the scholarly articles written about Chevron in the past year, see, for
example, John M. Golden, Working Without Chevron: The PTO as Prime Mover, 65 DUKE L.J.
1657, 1660 (2016), discussing Chevron deference for U.S. Patent and Trademark Office interpretations; Philip Hamburger, Chevron Bias, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1187, 1188–89 (2016), contending that “the key constitutional questions” raised by Chevron “have been neglected” and
proceeding to discuss same; Matthew A. Melone, King v. Burwell and the Chevron Doctrine: Did
the Court Invite Judicial Activism?, 64 U. KAN. L. REV. 663, 664–65 (2016), arguing that the
Court’s approach to Chevron review in King v. Burwell “appears to provide the judicial branch
with the opportunity to impose its own policy preferences with respect to issues best left to
Congress”; and Christopher J. Walker, Chevron Deference and Patent Exceptionalism, 65 DUKE
L.J. ONLINE 149, 150 (2016), asking “whether courts should apply Chevron deference to interpretations of substantive patent law advanced by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.”
18 For example, according to Westlaw, in 2015, Chevron was cited in 591 federal court
opinions, including 8 issued by the Supreme Court. These statistics exceed those from most prior
years. Although judicial citations of Chevron declined in 2016—with only 514 federal court opinions, including 4 issued by the Supreme Court citing Chevron—the decline is roughly in line with
year-to-year fluctuations over the past decade.
19 135 S. Ct. 1199 (2015).
20 Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).
21 Mortg. Bankers, 135 S. Ct. at 1211–12 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
22 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015).
23 Id. at 2712, 2714 (Thomas, J., concurring).
24 Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1151 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J.,
concurring).
25 Id. at 1155 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison)).
26 Separation of Powers Restoration Act of 2016, H.R. 4768, 114th Cong. (2016). The
House passed an expanded version of SOPRA as part of the Regulatory Accountability Act of
2017, H.R. 5, 115th Cong. (2017). See infra Section III.D (analyzing both versions of SOPRA).
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the APA to require de novo review of agency interpretations of law.27
Several prominent Senators have expressed support for SOPRA as
well,28 although regulatory reform legislation under consideration in
the Senate does not include either version of SOPRA or otherwise
repudiate or even curtail Chevron.29
Digging a little deeper, one can identify several ways in which the
Supreme Court has arguably weakened Chevron deference already in
both scope and substance. Certainly, with its 2001 decision in United
States v. Mead Corp.,30 the Court restricted Chevron’s application to
agency actions carrying the “force of law” pursuant to congressionally
delegated authority, relegating other agency actions like opinion letters, enforcement guidelines, and most informal adjudications to the
less deferential Skidmore review.31 Much more recently, in King v.
Burwell,32 the Court demonstrated its inclination to avoid using Chevron in resolving so-called “major questions.”33 The Court arguably has
exhibited a willingness to apply Chevron’s two steps more aggressively
as well; for example, the Court gave Chevron’s second step greater

27 See H.R. 4768 § 2; see also Vikram David Amar, Chevron Deference and the Proposed
“Separation of Powers Restoration Act of 2016”: A Sign of the Times, JUSTIA: VERDICT (July 26,
2016), https://verdict.justia.com/2016/07/26/chevron-deference-proposed-separation-powersrestoration-act-2016-sign-times (discussing the legislation’s goal of overturning Chevron). But see
Kristin E. Hickman, The Proposed Separation of Powers Restoration Act: Why?, ADMIN. & REG.
L. NEWS, Summer 2016, at 6, 6–7 (questioning whether the 2016 version of SOPRA would really
accomplish that goal).
28 See, e.g., Orrin Hatch & John Ratcliffe, Sen. Hatch, Rep. Ratcliffe: It’s Time to Restore
Accountability to Our Runaway Bureaucracy, FOX NEWS (June 7, 2016), http://www.fox
news.com/opinion/2016/06/07/sen-hatch-rep-ratcliffe-its-time-to-restore-accountability-to-ourrunaway-bureaucracy.html; Press Release, Senator Mike Lee, Senate, House Leaders Introduce
Bill to Restore Regulatory Accountability Through Judicial Review (Mar. 17, 2016), http://
www.lee.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2016/3/senate-house-leaders-introduce-bill-to-restore-regulatory-accountability-through-judicial-review (listing Senators Hatch (R-UT), Grassley (R-IA),
Lee (R-UT), Lankford (R-OK), Flake (R-AZ), Inhofe (R-OK), Tillis (R-NC), Cruz (R-TX),
Cornyn (R-TX), Sasse (R-NE), and Sullivan (R-AK) as introducing the bill in the Senate).
29

See Regulatory Accountability Act of 2017, S. 951, 115th Cong. (2017).

30

533 U.S. 218 (2001).

See id. at 229–34, 238 (announcing standard and denying Chevron review to Customs
Service tariff ruling letter); see also Christensen v. Harris Cty., 529 U.S. 576, 586–88 (2000)
(counseling Skidmore rather than Chevron review for agency “interpretations contained in policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines”).
31

32

135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015).

See id. at 2488–89; see also Kristin E. Hickman, The (Perhaps) Unintended Consequences of King v. Burwell, 2015 PEPP. L. REV. 56, 62–64 (describing King as an effort to limit
Chevron’s scope); cf. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159–60 (2000)
(suggesting Chevron review should be unavailable in “extraordinary cases”).
33
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heft by incorporating State Farm’s reasoned decisionmaking
requirement.34
Still, Chevron has always been controversial, even before its purported decline. Critics have offered all kinds of reasons why Chevron
is flawed or misguided.35 And, perhaps joining or at least influenced
by Chevron’s critics, commentators have long predicted that Chevron
deference would not last. Chevron coincided approximately with the
rise of textualism, and at Chevron’s ten-year mark, Thomas Merrill
linked the Supreme Court’s increasing reliance on textualist reasoning
to a “waning” of Chevron.36 Shortly after Chevron’s twentieth birthday, Linda Jellum similarly described Chevron’s “relevance” as “waning,” this time due largely to the Court’s limiting of Chevron’s scope in
Mead.37 And now, again, having passed its thirtieth year, Chevron is
supposedly on the wane again.
We take a different view. Leave aside, for the sake of argument,
stare decisis and whether Chevron even meets traditional criteria the
Supreme Court has applied when overturning precedents.38 Although
the Court’s rhetoric regarding Chevron’s scope and operation continues to evolve, we believe that reports of the doctrine’s pending demise
34 See Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2125 (2016) (blending Chevron
and State Farm analysis); Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2706–07 (2015) (invoking State Farm
in connection with Chevron review); Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42, 52 n.7 (2011) (describing
Chevron step two and State Farm analysis as “the same”).
35 For just a few of the many articles criticizing Chevron, see Jack M. Beermann, End the
Failed Chevron Experiment Now: How Chevron Has Failed and Why It Can and Should Be
Overruled, 42 CONN. L. REV. 779, 782–84 (2010), listing ten “overlapping sets of reasons” for
why “Chevron should be overruled”; Christopher Edley, Jr., The Governance Crisis, Legal Theory, and Political Ideology, 1991 DUKE L.J. 561, 587–88, describing Chevron as “the Supreme
Court’s conceptually flawed effort to control the inclinations of some lower court judges to impose their politically unaccountable, unreconstructed New Deal prejudices to push the bureaucracy toward an aggressive regulatory stance”; and Elizabeth V. Foote, Statutory Interpretation
or Public Administration: How Chevron Misconceives the Function of Agencies and Why It Matters, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 673, 678–80 (2007), suggesting that Chevron is predicated on a misunderstanding of agencies’ “operational, policy-implementing role.”
36 See Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH.
U. L.Q. 351, 363–73 (1994).
37 See Linda Jellum, Chevron’s Demise: A Survey of Chevron from Infancy to Senescence,
59 ADMIN. L. REV. 725, 772–81 (2007) [hereinafter Jellum, Chevron’s Demise]; see also Linda D.
Jellum, The Impact of the Rise and Fall of Chevron on the Executive’s Power to Make and Interpret Law, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 141, 188 (2012) (“With two important changes to Chevron’s
application—restricting the types of agency interpretations entitled to deference and curbing the
implied-delegation rationale—the Court has begun to reclaim the interpretive power it ceded
and the lawmaking power it shifted with the rise and fall of Chevron.”).
38 See, e.g., Jerold H. Israel, Gideon v. Wainwright: The “Art” of Overruling, 1963 SUP. CT.
REV. 211, 220–26 (identifying “changed conditions,” “lessons of experience,” and inconsistent
“later precedent” as reasons generally offered by the Court).
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are overblown. Moreover, we suggest, those who actively seek to eliminate Chevron deference are aiming at the wrong target.
For one thing, the common narrative of Chevron’s revolutionary
rise and dominance of judicial review of administrative action is exaggerated. The sheer volume of cases in which courts must consider
agency interpretations of statutes means courts inevitably apply Chevron a lot. But for all of the hype and attention, Chevron is, first and
foremost, just a standard of review—one among several that courts
apply in evaluating agency action.39 Rhetoric notwithstanding, Chevron alone does not truly drive the outcome in most of the cases in
which courts apply it.40
Admittedly, because the Justices have never been able to agree
on precisely how Chevron review works, the Supreme Court has done
a poor job of applying Chevron consistently. Consequently, Chevron is
susceptible to competing theories regarding how it does and should
operate, all employed here and there by one court or another, often
seemingly interchangeably, without the courts acknowledging or perhaps even recognizing the distinctions.41 This jurisprudential inconsistency has produced a ridiculous degree of doctrinal complexity that
provides endless fodder for discussion (and discontent) about Chevron. Yet standards of judicial review are never precise instruments,
and many other legal doctrines are highly malleable in their application without occasioning the vitriol presently being hurled at Chevron.
Finally, predictions of (or hopes for) Chevron’s pending demise
fail to take into account that Chevron deference, or something much
like it, is a necessary consequence of and corollary to Congress’s longstanding habit of relying on agencies to exercise substantial policymaking discretion to resolve statutory details.42 As administrative
law’s best-known doctrine, Chevron has become a convenient scapegoat or bogeyman for those who are unhappy with the administrative
state or judicial review of agency action. But unless Congress chooses
to assume substantially more responsibility for making policy choices
itself or the courts decide to seriously reinvigorate the nondelegation
doctrine—neither of which seems remotely likely—at least some variant of Chevron deference will be essential to guide and assist courts
from intruding too deeply into a policy sphere for which they are illsuited.
39
40
41
42

See
See
See
See

infra
infra
infra
infra

Section III.A.
Section III.A.
Part II.
Section III.C.
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In support of our argument, this Article proceeds in three parts.
Drawing from thirty years of Chevron jurisprudence and commentary,
Part I recognizes and examines two competing narratives of Chevron’s
trajectory—one a quite dramatic tale of a singular legal doctrine, and
the other a more nuanced (and more boring), but more realistic, story
of an important and routinely applied but not omnipresent standard
of review. Part II offers a taxonomy of sorts, documenting several operating variations of Chevron that together help explain why the doctrine has been simultaneously confusing and durable. Lastly, Part III
defends Chevron’s basic premise as well as the doctrine’s inevitability
given Congress’s habit of delegating the power to make significant
policy decisions to agencies in the first place.
I.

CHEVRON’S COMPETING NARRATIVES

The great irony in Chevron’s tale is that Justice Stevens, who authored the Supreme Court’s opinion in that case, did not intend and
never really thought of Chevron as a departure from precedent.43
Even before Chevron, if the meaning of the statute was clear or plain,
then the administering agency could not successfully claim deference
for a contrary interpretation.44 And for decades prior, the Court had
counseled the sort of strong, mandatory deference described by Chevron for at least some agency interpretations of statutes.45 Peter Schuck
43 See Thomas W. Merrill, The Story of Chevron: The Making of an Accidental Landmark,
in ADMINISTRATIVE LAW STORIES 398, 412–20 (Peter L. Strauss ed., 2006) (summarizing evidence that the Court did not see Chevron as making a significant statement about administrative
law doctrine); Robert V. Percival, Environmental Law in the Supreme Court: Highlights from the
Marshall Papers, 23 ENVTL. L. REP. 10606, 10613 (1993) (documenting little deliberation in the
Chevron case).
44 See Norwegian Nitrogen Prods. Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294, 315 (1933) (“True
indeed it is that administrative practice does not avail to overcome a statute so plain in its commands as to leave nothing for construction.”); see also, e.g., SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 117–19
(1978) (declining to defer to an agency interpretation deemed “inconsistent with the statutory
mandate”); Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 181, 183–85 (1969) (rejecting agency interpretation
found inconsistent with clear congressional intent); Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Prods., Inc., 322
U.S. 607, 616–19 (1944) (embracing deference for agency gap-filling but rejecting agency regulation as “not authorized” by Congress).
45 See, e.g., Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 44 (1981) (“Although we do not
abdicate review in these circumstances, our task is the limited one of ensuring that the Secretary
did not ‘excee[d] his statutory authority’ and that the regulation is not arbitrary or capricious.”
(alteration in original) (quoting Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 426 (1977))); Batterton, 432
U.S. at 425 (“In a situation of this kind, Congress entrusts to the Secretary, rather than to the
courts, the primary responsibility for interpreting the statutory term. . . . A reviewing court is not
free to set aside those regulations simply because it would have interpreted the statute in a
different manner.”); Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Scarlett, 300 U.S. 471, 474 (1937)
(“The regulation having been made by the commission in pursuance of constitutional statutory
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and E. Donald Elliott have noted that Chevron “failed to instruct the
circuits with the unmistakable clarity and moral authority that seem
minimally necessary . . . for the Court to succeed in altering the shape
of court-agency relationships.”46 Without subsequent cases parsing
and elevating the significance of its language, Chevron might have
been a rather unremarkable case.
Nevertheless, Chevron is often described as sparking a revolution. Certainly, with its famous two-step test, Chevron altered the
rhetoric of judicial deference.48 In case after case, judges now ask first
whether the meaning of the statute at issue is clear and then, if it is
not, whether the administering agency’s interpretation of that statute
is “permissible.”49 Scholars also have argued that Chevron meaningfully shifted interpretive power from the judicial branch to administrative agencies by calling for strong, mandatory deference to implicit as
well as explicit delegations of authority to fill statutory gaps.50 And
one can easily fashion a dramatic narrative arc for Chevron from the
thirty years of jurisprudence and commentary that followed it. First,
Chevron gains the Court’s allegiance, comes to dominate judicial review of agency actions, and shifts interpretive power significantly from
courts to agencies. Then, the Court gradually begins to reclaim its au47

authority, it has the same force as though prescribed in terms by the statute.”); AT&T Co. v.
United States, 299 U.S. 232, 236–37 (1936); see also KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW OF THE EIGHTIES: 1989 SUPPLEMENT TO ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 29:16 (1989)
(suggesting that Chevron reflected longstanding doctrine).
46 Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of
Federal Administrative Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 984, 1028.
47 See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J.
969, 976 (1992) (“Justice Stevens’ opinion contained several features that can only be described
as ‘revolutionary,’ even if no revolution was intended at the time.” (footnote omitted)); Cass R.
Sunstein, Beyond Marbury: The Executive’s Power to Say What the Law Is, 115 YALE L.J. 2580,
2595–96 (2006) (observing that “the Court itself may have had limited ambitions for its decision
in Chevron[,] [b]ut the decision was soon viewed as a kind of revolution”).
48 See, e.g., King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488 (2015) (observing that the Court “often
appl[ies] the two-step framework announced in Chevron”); Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v.
Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 986 (2005) (describing Chevron as “establish[ing] a familiar two-step procedure for evaluating whether an agency’s interpretation of a statute is lawful”);
Harkonen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 800 F.3d 1143, 1149 (9th Cir. 2015) (analyzing agency statutory interpretation “using the familiar two-step framework established by Chevron”).
49 See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984)
(outlining the two steps); see also infra Section II.A (breaking down the Chevron opinion’s exposition of the two-step test).
50 See, e.g., DAVIS, supra note 45, § 29:16-1; Kristin E. Hickman, The Need for Mead: Rejecting Tax Exceptionalism in Judicial Deference, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1537, 1548 (2006); Thomas
W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 833–34 (2001); Cass R.
Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2075 (1990).
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thority.51 The Court curtails Chevron’s scope and applies its two steps
more critically. Individual Justices begin to question Chevron’s validity.52 Now, Congress considers legislation to abolish deferential review
of agency legal interpretations.53
Of course, the actual story of Chevron is more nuanced. While
Chevron has been and remains unquestionably prominent, the Court’s
actual fidelity to Chevron deference has never been consistent—reflecting more ebb and flow than rise and fall.
A. Chevron Emerges
The D.C. Circuit was the first to pull the two-step Chevron framework from Justice Stevens’s opinion.54 Other circuits cited Chevron in
its first year, but did not explicitly apply its two steps.55 A few years
after his elevation from the D.C. Circuit, Justice Scalia praised Chevron’s two-step analytical approach as “unquestionably better than
what preceded it.”56
To its supporters, Chevron cemented deference as the appropriate judicial attitude for agency interpretations of statutes. In particular, Chevron counseled that courts should only overturn an agency’s
resolution of statutory ambiguity when “arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.”57 In other words, judicial deference was
not merely advisable but mandatory when the meaning of a statute
was unclear and the agency’s interpretation was permissible. Justice
Scalia maintained that Chevron’s “across-the-board presumption” in
See infra Sections I.A, I.B.
See infra Section I.C.
53 See infra Section I.D.
54 See Rettig v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 744 F.2d 133, 140–41 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“As
we understand the Supreme Court’s most recent pronouncements in Chevron, our inquiry consists of two steps.”); see also Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n v. U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd., 749 F.2d 856, 860–62
(D.C. Cir. 1984); Am. Methyl Corp. v. EPA, 749 F.2d 826, 833 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Gen. Motors
Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 742 F.2d 1561, 1566–67 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
55 See, e.g., Phila. Gear Corp. v. FDIC, 751 F.2d 1131, 1135 (10th Cir. 1984) (citing Chevron and applying Skidmore’s factors); South Dakota v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 740 F.2d 619,
621–23 (8th Cir. 1984) (analyzing whether the agency had a “substantial basis” for the policy
decisions embodied by its interpretation); New Eng. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n of
Me., 742 F.2d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 1984) (rejecting a Federal Communications Commission interpretation because the interpretation does not reflect its position “after debate among staff or commissioners” and an agency interpretation “cannot bind a court as to the meaning of a jurisdictional
statute”). But see Lynch v. Rank, 747 F.2d 528, 534 (9th Cir. 1984) (rejecting an agency interpretation as contrary to the statutory text).
56 Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE
L.J. 511, 517.
57 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–53 (1984).
51
52
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favor of agency discretion often better approximated congressional intent than the “wild-goose chase” of traditional, court-conducted statutory interpretation.58 The D.C. Circuit was also a leader in quickly and
wholeheartedly embracing this strong interpretation of Chevron.59
Many judges and scholars lauded Chevron as a blueprint for balancing the roles of agencies and the courts in the modern administrative state.60 Yet, as with any new doctrine, even proponents of
Chevron recognized that the standard presented some difficulties.
Judge Kenneth Starr observed that Chevron “raise[d] some rather difficult questions” regarding which doctrines previously relied upon by
judges in interpreting statutes were appropriate at step one.61 Indeed,
Justice Scalia prophesized that “the future battles over acceptance of
agency interpretations of law will be fought” over step one’s requisite
clarity.62
Also, the strong version of Chevron deference faced resistance.
Cynthia Farina worried that Chevron would aggrandize the executive
branch to such an extent that it would neuter the constitutional checks
on lawmaking endorsed by bicameralism and presentment.63 Cass
Sunstein complained that Chevron undermined the principle of Marbury v. Madison64 that “[c]ourts . . . are supposed to say what the law
is,” and violated the APA’s vision of the judiciary as a check against

58

Scalia, supra note 56, at 516–17.

See Merrill, supra note 43, at 422 (attributing “Chevron’s rise from obscurity” generally
to the D.C. Circuit and particularly to Justice Scalia, who was serving on that court when Chevron was decided and first applied).
59

R
R

60 See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Role of Constitutional and Political Theory in Administrative Law, 64 TEX. L. REV. 469, 507 (1985) (“The Court’s unanimous decision in Chevron
leads logically to the constitutionally correct solution to the problem of agencies with vast policymaking power.”); Kenneth W. Starr, Cass R. Sunstein, Richard K. Willard, Alan B. Morrison &
Ronald M. Levin, Judicial Review of Administrative Action in a Conservative Era, 39 ADMIN. L.
REV. 353, 360 (1987) [hereinafter Judicial Review of Administrative Action in a Conservative
Era] (statement of Kenneth W. Starr) (describing Chevron’s two-step framework as “straightforward” and “clear”); Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year: Some Implications of
the Supreme Court’s Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L.
REV. 1093, 1118–26 (1987) (suggesting Chevron’s increased utility in an era of both indeterminacy of statutory meaning and limited Supreme Court capacity to resolve disagreements among
the circuits).
61 Judicial Review of Administrative Action in a Conservative Era, supra note 60, at 365
(statement of Kenneth W. Starr).
62

Scalia, supra note 56, at 520–21.

See generally Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the
Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452 (1989).
63

64

5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).

R
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administrative agencies.65 Justice Stephen Breyer, then a judge on the
First Circuit, acknowledged that courts should consider the agency’s
comparative expertise as well as statutory clarity and congressional
intent to delegate decisionmaking authority when evaluating an
agency’s interpretation of a statute.66 But like Sunstein, Justice Breyer
clearly viewed courts rather than agencies as the rightful and primary
arbiters of statutory meaning.67 He described the D.C. Circuit’s strict,
two-step interpretation of Chevron as simplistic and contrary to
“‘proper’ judicial attitudes,” and a “blanket rule” of deference as “seriously overbroad, counterproductive and sometimes senseless” in an
area of law replete with different statutes, policy considerations, and
problems.68 Rather, he contended that Chevron was more appropriately “limited to its factual and statutory context” on account of “the
difficulties associated with environmental regulation.”69
Moreover, although lower courts deferred to agency interpretations more often after Chevron,70 the Supreme Court’s early postChevron jurisprudence reflects its collective ambivalence regarding
the decision’s significance.71 Justice Scalia enthusiastically promoted
the strong version of Chevron,72 writing separately to apply Chevron’s
two-step framework when other Justices would not.73 Often, however,
the Court failed to cite Chevron at all in cases where the standard
65 Judicial Review of Administrative Action in a Conservative Era, supra note 60, at 367–68
(statement of Cass R. Sunstein).
66 See Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L.
REV. 363, 370–71 (1986).
67 See id. at 373.
68 Id.
69 Id. at 381–82.
70 Schuck & Elliott, supra note 46, at 1020–51 (analyzing the shift in lower court rulings
post-Chevron).
71 See Linda R. Hirshman, Postmodern Jurisprudence and the Problem of Administrative
Discretion, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 646, 688 (1988) (observing inconsistency in Chevron’s first four
years).
72 See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 259–60 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment) (arguing the contextual factor test is an “anachronism”);
Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354, 380–81 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (applying Chevron to jurisdictional issues); NLRB v. United Food &
Commercial Workers Union, Local 23, 484 U.S. 112, 133 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“I . . .
write separately only to note that our decision demonstrates the continuing and unchanged vitality of the test for judicial review of agency determinations of law set forth in Chevron . . . .”).
73 See, e.g., Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. at 259–60 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) (arguing that Chevron reversed the contextual factor tests); Miss.
Power & Light Co., 487 U.S. at 380–81 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); INS v. CardozaFonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing against legislative history at step one).

R
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seemed obviously appropriate.74 As Thomas Merrill has documented,
in evaluating agency statutory interpretations from 1984 to 1990, the
Court relied on contextual factors derived from Skidmore v. Swift &
Co.75 and other pre-Chevron precedents as often as it applied Chevron, and the Court affirmed fewer agency interpretations after Chevron than before.76 Meanwhile, notwithstanding his authorship of the
Court’s Chevron opinion, Justice Stevens resisted Chevron’s intrusion
on traditional judicial authority, insisting that “[t]he judiciary is the
final authority on issues of statutory construction.”77
B. Chevron’s Apparent Dominance
Over time, Justice Scalia’s persistence subdued much of his colleagues’ ambivalence about using Chevron’s two-step framework. The
Court came to accept that statutory interpretation “is often more a
question of policy than of law,” and that Chevron “reflects a sensitivity to the proper roles of the political and judicial branches.”78 By
1990, all of the Justices had joined at least one opinion invoking a twostep Chevron.79 By 2000, Chevron had become one of the most cited
and applied Supreme Court decisions in history.80 The Court showed
no sign of abandoning the strong interpretation of Chevron as Justices
Breyer and Stevens had hoped. Rather, Chevron had, at least in that
sense, entered its prime.
In many ways, Chevron seemed both dominant and highly deferential. Government lawyers often pressured courts to apply Chevron’s
mandatory deference in new contexts.81 As a result, the Supreme
74 See, e.g., Hirshman, supra note 71, at 690 (questioning the Court’s failure to apply or
even cite Chevron in Louisiana Public Service Commission v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355 (1986), even
though the agency’s “claim to deference could hardly have been stronger”).
75 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (calling for judges to give “weight” to an agency’s interpretation of a statute based upon contextual factors such as thoroughness, validity, and consistency).
76 Merrill, supra note 47, at 980–84.
77 Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 447–48 (quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984)).
78 Pauley v. Bethenergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 696–97 (1991).
79 Merrill & Hickman, supra note 50, at 838.
80 Richard Pierce at one point suggested that Chevron “has been cited and applied in more
cases than any other Supreme Court decision in history.” 1 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 140 (4th ed. 2002). Other scholars contested Pierce’s assertion as an
“overstatement” and claimed that mantle for other cases. See, e.g., Herz, supra note 2, at 1870
n.19 (comparing federal case citations to Chevron with those of other cases). At a minimum,
Chevron can claim to be the most cited decision in contemporary administrative law. Id.; see also
supra notes 5–16 and accompanying text (documenting citation counts for canonical administrative law cases).
81 Merrill & Hickman, supra note 50, at 835.
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Court and the federal circuit courts of appeals applied Chevron to an
increasingly broad array of agency legal interpretations. Chevron itself
was concerned with regulations interpreting the Clean Air Act82
promulgated by the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) using
notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures.83 Subsequently, however, courts extended Chevron to agency adjudications,84 to proposed
or temporary regulations lacking notice and comment,85 and to a variety of informal agency actions exempt from formalized procedures,
for just a few examples.86 Beyond interpretive format, Chevron
quickly crept from environmental law into other regulatory areas,87
assuming precisely the seminal status that Justice Stevens initially
sought to eschew.
Courts applying Chevron often found statutes ambiguous and deferred to agency interpretations with little apparent effort to discern
statutory meaning through examination of text, history, or purpose.88
In Pauley v. Bethenergy Mines, Inc.,89 for example, the Supreme Court
found deference appropriate merely because the Black Lung Benefits
Act90 provisions at stake “produced a complex and highly technical
regulatory program” that “require[d] significant expertise” to administer.91 In National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Boston & Maine
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685.
See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 845–46.
84 See, e.g., Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 647–48 (1990) (informal adjudication); Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 574 (1988) (NLRB adjudication); Young v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 476 U.S. 974,
978–79 (1986) (FDA no-action decision).
85 See, e.g., Pauley v. Bethenergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 697–98 (1991) (deferring to
interim agency regulations).
86 See, e.g., Elizabeth Blackwell Health Ctr. for Women v. Knoll, 61 F.3d 170, 181–82 (3d
Cir. 1995) (granting Chevron deference to an interpretation of the Hyde Amendment articulated
in two letters from the Director of the Medicaid Bureau of the Health Care Financing Administration to all state Medicaid directors); Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist. v. Wartenberg, 59 F.3d 884,
894 (9th Cir. 1995) (applying Chevron to a letter from the Assistant Secretary of Education to all
chief state school officers clarifying United States Department of Education policy regarding the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act).
87 See, e.g., Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 744–45 (1996) (Comptroller of
the Currency interpretation); Elizabeth Blackwell Health Ctr., 61 F.3d at 181–82 (Secretary of
Health and Human Services interpretation); Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist., 59 F.3d at 894 (Department of Education interpretation).
88 See PUD No. 1 v. Wash. Dep’t of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 728–29 (1994) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (criticizing the majority for accepting an agency’s interpretation without any analysis
of the statutory text or reasonableness).
89 501 U.S. 680 (1991).
90 Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-303, 86 Stat. 150.
91 Pauley, 501 U.S. at 697.
82
83
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Corp.,92 the Court declared the agency’s interpretation “permissible”
simply because it was “not in conflict with the plain language of the
statute.”93 And in Yellow Transportation, Inc. v. Michigan,94 the Court
deferred to the agency’s regulations based on the cursory observation
that the relevant statutory subprovision was facially “silent” and
“d[id] not foreclose” the agency’s approach.95 Additionally, for fifteen
years after deciding Chevron, the Court did not reject a single agency
interpretation at Chevron step two.96
The federal circuit courts of appeals in particular applied Chevron very deferentially. In a study of cases from 1995 and 1996, Orin
Kerr found that circuit courts accepted agency interpretations in 73%
of cases applying the Chevron standard.97 The circuit courts reached
step two in 62% of Chevron cases and upheld the agency’s interpretation in 89% of those cases.98 To textualists’ dismay, courts did not always “recognize[] the existence of a large area in which Congress has
‘directly addressed precise questions.’”99
On the other hand, the Justices continued to disagree over the
terms of Chevron’s operation.100 For example, the Supreme Court did
not always eschew extensive analysis at Chevron step one. In MCI
Telecommunications Corp. v. AT&T,101 for example, Justice Scalia’s
opinion for the Court analyzed dictionary definitions and explored the
statutory scheme’s structure and purpose in deciding that the claimed
power of the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) to make
tariff filing optional for certain long-distance carriers was “beyond the
meaning that the statute [could] bear.”102 Justice Stevens in dissent
accused the Court of “a rigid literalism that deprives the FCC of the
flexibility Congress meant it to have.”103 In FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,104 Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion surveyed
503 U.S. 407 (1992).
Id. at 417–18.
94 537 U.S. 36 (2002).
95 Id. at 45–46.
96 The first such decision was AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Board, 525 U.S. 366 (1999).
97 Orin S. Kerr, Shedding Light on Chevron: An Empirical Study of the Chevron Doctrine
in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 15 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 30 (1998).
98 Id. at 30–31.
99 See Judicial Review of Administrative Action in a Conservative Era, supra note 60, at 367
(statement of Cass R. Sunstein).
100 Merrill & Hickman, supra note 50, at 838–53.
101 512 U.S. 218 (1994).
102 Id. at 229.
103 Id. at 235 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
104 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
92
93

R
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decades of tobacco legislation in concluding that the Food and Drug
Administration (“FDA”) “clearly” lacked jurisdiction to regulate tobacco products under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.105 Justice
Breyer in dissent accused the Court of ignoring the “literal language
and general purpose” of the statute.106 Orin Kerr’s study of Chevron
in the mid-1990s showed that, although the federal circuit courts of
appeals found ambiguity and proceeded to step two significantly more
often than not, they rejected the agency’s interpretation in 58% of
cases resolved at step one.107
Some members of the Supreme Court continued to rely on the
contextual factors outlined in the Court’s pre-Chevron jurisprudence,
even as they applied Chevron’s two-step framework. For example, in
Brown & Williamson Tobacco, Justice O’Connor cited the FDA’s inconsistency with respect to its interpretation as “important context” in
reaching that conclusion,108 against Justice Breyer’s objection that
“the FDA’s change of positions does not make a significant legal difference” under Chevron.109 In INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,110 Justice Stevens cited the agency’s inconsistency in the course of denying Chevron
deference.111 Likewise, in applying Chevron to resolve Good Samaritan Hospital v. Shalala,112 Justice White maintained that “the consistency of an agency’s position is a factor in assessing the weight that
position is due.”113 By contrast, in Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota),
N.A.,114 Justice Scalia refused to deny Chevron deference to agency
regulations simply because the agency’s new interpretation might conflict with previous agency interpretations, saying that “change is not
invalidating, since the whole point of Chevron is to leave the discretion provided by the ambiguities of a statute with the implementing
agency.”115 As Thomas Merrill observed, cases such as these collec105 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.); Brown & Williamson Tobacco, 529 U.S. at
126.
106

Brown & Williamson Tobacco, 529 U.S. at 162 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

107

Kerr, supra note 97, at 31–32, 47.

108

Brown & Williamson Tobacco, 529 U.S. at 157.

109

Id. at 186 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

110

480 U.S. 421 (1987).

111

Id. at 446 n.30.

112

508 U.S. 402 (1993).

113

Id. at 417.

114

517 U.S. 735 (1996).

115

Id. at 742.
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tively reveal tensions regarding the continued viability of contextual
factors within the Chevron framework.116
Collectively as well, the courts’ applications of Chevron reflected
tremendous disagreement over the scope of Chevron’s applicability.
The Supreme Court often repeated the maxim that Chevron applies
when an agency is “charged with administering” a statute, but the
Court offered little or no further explanation as to what that meant or
why it turned to Chevron when it did.117 In many cases concerning
agency legal interpretations, the Court continued not to apply the
Chevron standard at all.118 In a comprehensive study of post-Chevron
Supreme Court cases, William Eskridge and Lauren Baer documented
that only 8.3% of the 1014 cases involving agency interpretations of
statutes applied the Chevron standard, while 53.6% saw the Court relying purely on its own analysis.119 Confronted with such inconsistency
from the Supreme Court and a substantially more varied array of
agency actions, the lower courts splintered into a bevy of circuit splits
and lesser disagreements over the circumstances in which Chevron
should or should not apply.120
C. Chevron’s Arguable Decline
Since 2000, several Supreme Court opinions have seemed to
weaken Chevron in both substance and scope. The most obvious trend
has been in narrowing the scope of Chevron’s applicability. Several
cases, however, have also signaled the Court’s sanction of more robust
and intrusive inquiries at both of Chevron’s two steps.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Mead, which provided a threshold question for determining Chevron’s applicability and thereby narrowed Chevron’s scope, is the most obvious contributor to Chevron’s
purported decline.121 According to the Mead Court, Chevron deference is available only for agency interpretations issued in the exercise
See Merrill, supra note 47, at 977–78.
See, e.g., Smiley, 517 U.S. at 739; Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 184 (1991); Miss. Power
& Light Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354, 380–81 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment).
118 See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 493–94 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(analyzing Chevron when the majority had not); EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244,
259–60 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (identifying Chevron as the applicable standard).
119 William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme
Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J.
1083, 1098–100 (2008).
120 Merrill & Hickman, supra note 50, at 848–52.
121 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
116

R

117
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of congressionally delegated authority to act with legal force.122 Under
Mead, a court should ascertain whether “it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the
force of law.”123 If a court determines that Congress has delegated
such authority, the court then asks whether the agency “promulgated
[its interpretation] in the exercise of that authority.”124 The Mead
Court specified that, although Chevron typically applies to interpretations adopted in notice-and-comment rulemaking or formal adjudications, “the want of that procedure here does not decide the case.”125
Drawing from a Mead precursor, Christensen v. Harris County,126
however, the Court also specified that “policy statements, agency
manuals, and enforcement guidelines” are “beyond the Chevron
pale.”127 If an agency interpretation does not satisfy Mead’s inquiry,
then the agency’s interpretation remains “entitled to respect” to the
extent it has the “power to persuade” under the arguably less deferential Skidmore standard.128 Unlike Chevron, the Skidmore standard regards the courts as the primary interpreters of statutory meaning, even
as it counsels courts to respect an agency’s interpretation based on
“the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all
those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to
control.”129
The direct consequence of Mead has been the carving away of a
subcategory of agency statutory interpretations that courts decline to
review under Chevron. Since deciding Mead, the Supreme Court has
not extended Chevron deference to an agency statutory interpretation
expressed in a format other than a notice-and-comment regulation or
formal (or formal-ish) adjudication.130 But Mead has created its own
sort of doctrinal confusion, and Mead’s counterrevolution has been
Id. at 226–27.
Id.
124 Id. at 227.
125 Id. at 231.
126 529 U.S. 576 (2000) (holding that an agency opinion letter should be reviewed under
Skidmore).
127 Mead, 533 U.S. at 234 (quoting Christensen, 529 U.S. at 587).
128 Christensen, 529 U.S. at 587 (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140
(1944)).
129 Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.
130 See generally Kristin E. Hickman, The Three Phases of Mead, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 527
(2014) (surveying Supreme Court applications of Mead).
122
123
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blunted by the Justices’ competing attitudes about and doctrinal approaches to Chevron as well as Mead and Skidmore.131
The Supreme Court’s 2015 decision in King v. Burwell reflects
another effort to curtail Chevron’s reach.132 In that case, the Court
declined to apply the Chevron standard in reviewing an Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) regulation implementing an important aspect of
the Affordable Care Act.133 Writing for the majority, Chief Justice
Roberts reasoned that the interpretation at issue “involv[ed] billions
of dollars in spending each year and affect[ed] the price of health insurance for millions of people,” was of “deep ‘economic and political
significance,’” and was “central to [the] statutory scheme.”134 He also
observed that the IRS “has no expertise in crafting health insurance
policy.”135 In relying on such grounds to deny Chevron review to the
IRS’s regulation, Chief Justice Roberts drew from the Court’s earlier
decision in FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,136 rejecting
the FDA’s newfound claim of statutory authority to regulate the marketing of tobacco products.137 A brief passage at the end of Justice
O’Connor’s majority opinion in Brown & Williamson Tobacco suggested that Chevron might be inapplicable altogether in so-called “extraordinary cases” of political and economic significance when “there
may be reason to hesitate before concluding that Congress has intended such an implicit delegation.”138 Some commentators have suggested that King v. Burwell may herald a new categorical limitation on
Chevron’s scope,139 and the federal circuit courts of appeals could
heed that call and invalidate agency action when the agency lacks expressly delegated authority over a particular provision.140
See id. at 548–49; see also infra Part II.
See King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488–89 (2015).
133 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010);
see King, 135 S. Ct. at 2488–89.
134 King, 135 S. Ct. at 2489 (quoting Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2444
(2014)).
135 Id.
136 See supra text accompanying notes 104–06.
137 See King, 135 S. Ct. at 2488–89 (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,
529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000)).
138 Brown & Williamson Tobacco, 529 U.S. at 159–61.
139 See, e.g., Hickman, supra note 33, at 58; Jonas J. Monast, Major Questions About the
Major Questions Doctrine, 68 ADMIN. L. REV. 445, 474–76 (2016); Note, Major Question Objections, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2191, 2191–92 (2016).
140 See, e.g., ClearCorrect Operating, LLC v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 810 F.3d 1283, 1302 (Fed.
Cir. 2015) (O’Malley, J., concurring) (arguing that the Court should not examine the case under
Chevron because the agency’s interpretation presented a politically and economically significant
issue); see also infra Section II.H.
131
132

R

R
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Beyond questions of Chevron’s scope, other jurisprudence from
the Supreme Court has signaled more subtly the Court’s readiness to
employ Chevron’s two steps to reject agency interpretations on the
basis of either statutory clarity or agency unreasonableness. In
Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio,141 for example, six Justices across three
opinions disagreed sharply with Justice Kagan’s assertion in her plurality opinion that the statute at issue was ambiguous merely because
the text of a single subsection seemed internally contradictory on its
face.142 Chief Justice Roberts in concurrence rejected as “wrong” the
suggestion “that deference is warranted because of a direct conflict
between [two] clauses,” and called instead for considering the statutory scheme as a whole.143 Justice Sotomayor in dissent likewise
turned to traditional tools of statutory construction to resolve the conflict, criticizing the plurality for “neglect[ing] a fundamental tenet of
statutory interpretation: We do not lightly presume that Congress has
legislated in self-contradicting terms.”144
The Supreme Court has shown substantially greater willingness to
invalidate agency interpretations at Chevron step two. Again, for fifteen years after deciding Chevron, the Court did not invalidate a single agency interpretation after applying Chevron and declaring the
relevant statute ambiguous.145 The first such instance was AT&T
Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Board,146 involving clear congressional intent
for the FCC to give content to the obviously ambiguous statutory use
of the words “necessary” and “impair” in giving competitors access to
existing telephone networks.147 Justice Scalia acknowledged the
agency’s discretion to elaborate on the statutory requirements but
nevertheless declared its interpretation to be outside the boundaries
of permissibility.148 Since then, the Supreme Court has invalidated
agency interpretations of statutes at Chevron step two at least three
more times—in 2006,149 in 2014,150 and in 2015.151
134 S. Ct. 2191 (2014).
See id. at 2203 (calling the statutory provision “Janus-faced[;] [i]ts first half looks in one
direction, . . . [b]ut . . . the section’s second half looks another way”).
143 Id. at 2214 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in the judgment); see also id. at 2216 (Alito, J.,
dissenting) (agreeing with Chief Justice Roberts’s criticism of Justice Kagan’s depiction of Chevron step one).
144 Id. at 2220 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
145 See supra note 96 and accompanying text (making this observation).
146 525 U.S. 366 (1999).
147 Id. at 375–80.
148 Id. at 386–92.
149 See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006).
150 See Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014).
141
142

R
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Moreover, the Supreme Court has gradually embraced incorporating into Chevron step two the arbitrary and capricious analysis of
Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n of the United States v. State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,152 which requires agencies to offer
contemporaneous justifications of their policy choices that demonstrate reasoned decisionmaking.153 The first case to do so, in 2011, was
Judulang v. Holder,154 in which the Court evaluated a Board of Immigration Appeals interpretation of the Immigration and Nationality
Act155 concerning the criteria for granting discretionary relief to deportable and excludable aliens.156 The Court claimed that it was applying State Farm rather than Chevron as the standard in rejecting the
agency’s interpretation of the statute on the ground that the agency
relied on analysis that was not “tied, even if loosely,” to statutory purposes or operation.157 But responding in a footnote to the government’s argument that Chevron step two ought to apply rather than
State Farm, the Court equated the two: “[O]ur analysis would be the
same, because under Chevron step two, we ask whether an agency
interpretation is ‘arbitrary or capricious in substance.’”158
Justice Kagan, the author of the Court’s Judulang opinion, subsequently disavowed any intent to make a significant statement regarding administrative law doctrine.159 Nevertheless, subsequent opinions
of the Court again seem to embrace a relationship between Chevron
and State Farm. In Michigan v. EPA, the Court applied the Chevron
standard in considering a challenge to new EPA regulations concernSee Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015).
463 U.S. 29 (1983).
153 Id. at 43 (“The scope of review under the ‘arbitrary and capricious’ standard is narrow
and a court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the agency. Nevertheless, the agency must
examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action including a
‘rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.’ . . . Normally, an agency rule
would be arbitrary and capricious if the agency has relied on factors which Congress has not
intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an
explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.”
(quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962))).
154 565 U.S. 42 (2011).
155 Immigration & Nationality Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
156 Judulang, 565 U.S. at 45.
157 Id. at 55.
158 Id. at 52 n.7 (quoting Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 562
U.S. 44, 53 (2011)).
159 See KRISTIN E. HICKMAN & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE
§ 3.6 (5th ed. Supp. 2017) (documenting a public conversation between Pierce and Justice
Kagan).
151
152
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ing mercury and other emissions from coal- and oil-fired power
plants.160 As framed by the Court, the issue was whether the EPA can
reasonably refuse to consider cost in deciding that regulating emissions of hazardous air pollutants from power plants is “appropriate
and necessary” under the Clean Air Act.161 The EPA had concluded
that “costs should not be considered” when making that threshold determination.162 In a seemingly straightforward application of Chevron’s two steps, Justice Scalia acknowledged that the statutory terms
at issue could support more than one reasonable interpretation but
concluded that the EPA’s construction simply was not among the
available alternatives.163 Yet, Justice Scalia’s Chevron step two analysis
cited State Farm and included among his reasons for rejecting the
EPA’s interpretation the State Farm–like observation that “[n]o regulation is ‘appropriate’ if it does significantly more harm than good.”164
Most recently, in Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro,165 the Supreme Court blended references to procedural failings and State Farm
in applying Chevron to reject a Department of Labor (“DOL”) regulation interpreting the Fair Labor Standards Act.166 The regulation reversed a longstanding policy of the DOL that treated service advisors
as exempt from overtime under the statute.167 Justice Kennedy for the
Court introduced his analysis with a clear statement that he was applying Chevron’s two-step standard because Congress gave the DOL the
power to act with the force of law and the DOL did so by using noticeand-comment rulemaking to adopt its interpretation.168 He immediately followed, however, by stating that “Chevron deference is not
warranted where the regulation is ‘procedurally defective’—that is,
where the agency errs by failing to follow the correct procedures in
issuing the regulation.”169 He then proceeded to explain that the DOL

160

Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2706–07 (2015).

Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399, 2531; Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. at 2704.
161

162

Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. at 2705–06.

See id. at 2707 (“There are undoubtedly settings in which the phrase ‘appropriate and
necessary’ does not encompass cost. But this is not one of them.”).
163

164

Id.

165

136 S. Ct. 2117 (2016).

Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-601, 80 Stat. 830; see Encino
Motorcars, 136 S. Ct. at 2125–26.
166

167

See Encino Motorcars, 136 S. Ct. at 2123.

168

Id. at 2124–25.

169

Id. at 2125 (quoting United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227 (2001)).
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in this case failed procedurally under State Farm when it “offered
barely any explanation” for its policy change.170
On the other hand, even as some of the Supreme Court’s cases
have constrained or weakened Chevron deference, others have
seemed to expand Chevron’s reach. Two examples are particularly notable. First, the Court has allowed Chevron deference to trump stare
decisis in some cases. In National Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n
v. Brand X Internet Services171 in 2005, the Court held that a court’s
prior interpretation of a statute does not override the agency’s newer
interpretation unless the court held that the statute “unambiguously
forecloses the agency’s interpretation, and therefore contains no gap
for the agency to fill.”172 Justice Scalia scolded the Court for the
“breathtaking novelty” of rendering “judicial decisions subject to reversal by executive officers.”173 According to Justice Scalia, the majority’s “bizarre” holding permits agencies to take “action that the
Supreme Court found unlawful.”174 Subsequently, in United States v.
Home Concrete & Supply, LLC,175 the Court considered an IRS regulation that conflicted with a Supreme Court decision that predated
both Chevron and Brand X.176 A plurality of the Court concluded that
its earlier decision found the meaning of the statute clear, thus denying the agency the opportunity to adopt an alternative interpretation.177 Home Concrete led some commentators to suggest that the
Court is unlikely to apply Brand X’s holding to its own precedents,178
but that still leaves plenty of circuit court precedents to be overturned
by agency action.

170 Id. at 2126. Justice Ginsburg concurred with Justice Kennedy’s opinion but “stress[ed]
that nothing in today’s opinion disturbs well-established law. In particular, where an agency has
departed from a prior position, there is no ‘heightened standard’ of arbitrary-and-capricious review.” Id. at 2128 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
171

545 U.S. 967 (2005).

172

Id. at 982–83.

173

Id. at 1016 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

Id. at 1017. Justice Scalia’s dissent also questioned what this meant for step one: “Is the
standard for ‘unambiguous’ under the Court’s new agency-reversal rule the same as the standard
for ‘unambiguous’ under step one of Chevron? (If so, of course, every case that reaches step two
of Chevron will be agency-reversible.)” Id. at 1018–19.
174

175

566 U.S. 478 (2012).

176

See id. at 481.

177

See id. at 487.

See, e.g., David J. Shakow, A Concrete Shoe for Brand X?, 135 TAX NOTES 651, 651
(2012); Walker, supra note 17, at 161 n.63 (suggesting the Patent and Trademark Office should
“exercise caution” in relying on Brand X).
178

R
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Separately, in City of Arlington v. FCC,179 the Court settled a
longstanding disagreement among the federal circuit courts of appeals
by holding that an agency’s interpretation of its jurisdiction is entitled
to deference.180 Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia explained that
there is no difference “between an agency’s exceeding the scope of its
authority (its ‘jurisdiction’) and its exceeding authorized application
of authority that it unquestionably has.”181 Justice Scalia disposed of
the jurisdiction-nonjurisdictional line as a false dichotomy created to
depose Chevron in favor of judicial policymaking.182 In the alternative,
Justice Scalia proposed that the problem of excessive deference is
solved by defending statutory limits at step one.183 Writing separately
to express his own distinct views regarding how precisely Chevron operates, Justice Breyer nevertheless reached the same conclusion as the
majority.184
Unsurprisingly, the Supreme Court’s mixed messages regarding
Chevron’s functionality and scope are echoed in the jurisprudence of
the federal circuit courts of appeals. According to a comprehensive
study by Kent Barnett and Christopher Walker of 1558 cases evaluating agency statutory interpretations from 2003 through 2013, circuit
courts applying Chevron have continued to defer to agencies at a high
rate of 77.4% overall and a whopping 93.8% when the analysis has
reached Chevron step two.185 But agencies actually lost 61% of the
cases resolved by the circuit courts at Chevron step one, which in turn
represented 22.4% of all cases.186 The agency win rate was also lower
when the circuit courts specified no standard of review or opted for
Skidmore or de novo review, which combined represented another
25.2% of cases evaluated.187 The First Circuit deferred to agencies substantially more often (82.8% of cases) than the Ninth Circuit (65.8%
179

133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013).

See id. at 1866.
Id. at 1870.
182 See id. at 1872–73 (“Like the Hound of the Baskervilles, it is conjured by those with
greater quarry in sight: Make no mistake—the ultimate target here is Chevron itself. Savvy challengers of agency action would play the ‘jurisdictional’ card in every case. Some judges would be
deceived by the specious, but scary-sounding, ‘jurisdictional’-‘nonjurisdictional’ line; others
tempted by the prospect of making public policy by prescribing the meaning of ambiguous statutory commands.” (citation omitted)).
183 See id. at 1874.
184 See id. at 1875–77 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
185 Kent Barnett & Christopher J. Walker, Chevron in the Circuit Courts, 116 MICH. L.
REV. 1, 32–35 (2017).
186 Id.
187 Id.
180
181
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of cases).188 The D.C. Circuit applied the Chevron standard substantially more often (88.6% of cases) than the Sixth Circuit (60.7% of
cases).189 Deference rates in circuit court cases also varied tremendously depending on the agency and subject matter at issue.190
In sum, at least in the courts, Chevron’s story remains a nuanced
one. The Chevron doctrine may be evolving. Applications of Chevron
may be highly variable depending upon which Justice or circuit court
is writing the opinion. But reports that Chevron’s influence is waning—rather than merely evolving—overstate the case.
D. Calls to Overturn Chevron
At least partly as a result of their own internal disagreements regarding Chevron’s details, individual Justices have, in recent Terms,
expressed disillusionment with the Chevron standard. Perhaps the first
case to include an expression of discontent, Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n did not involve a question of statutory interpretation and,
therefore, did not implicate Chevron.191 The issue in that case was
whether a court could require an agency to use notice-and-comment
rulemaking if the agency sought to amend an otherwise exempt interpretative rule.192 Writing in concurrence, Justice Scalia wandered into
a discussion of deference doctrine and acknowledged that Chevron
“did not comport with the APA” and that the Court was “[h]eedless
of the original design of the APA” in developing its deference jurisprudence.193 This observation echoed a similar statement made by Justice Scalia in his dissent in Mead.194
Justice Scalia’s opinion in Mortgage Bankers stopped short of suggesting reconsidering Chevron’s validity. Concurring in Michigan v.
EPA, by contrast, Justice Thomas argued that Chevron raises concerns under Articles I and III of the Constitution.195 Article III “vests
the judicial power exclusively in Article III courts, not administrative
Id. at 44.
Id. at 45–46.
190 Id. at 50–54.
191 See Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199 (2015).
192 Id. at 1203.
193 Id. at 1211–12 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
194 See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 241 n.2 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(observing that the Court’s Chevron jurisprudence has largely ignored the APA’s instruction that
courts “decide all relevant questions of law”).
195 Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring); see also Mortg.
Bankers, 135 S. Ct. at 1215–25 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (raising similar constitutional concerns regarding Auer deference).
188
189
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agencies.”196 By contrast, according to Justice Thomas, Chevron deference “wrests from Courts the ultimate interpretative authority to ‘say
what the law is’”197 because it “precludes judges from exercising [independent] judgment, forcing them to abandon what they believe is ‘the
best reading of an ambiguous statute’ in favor of an agency’s construction.”198 Justice Thomas argued further that agencies claiming Chevron deference often have not engaged in “interpretation” but rather
have used statutory ambiguity “to formulate legally binding rules to
fill in gaps based on policy judgments made by the agency rather than
Congress.”199 Thus, he suggests, Chevron unconstitutionally “permit[s]
a body other than Congress to perform a function that requires an
exercise of the legislative power” by allowing agencies “the power to
decide—without any particular fidelity to the text—which policy goals
[they] wish[] to pursue.”200
Some scholars have argued that, if Chevron is to be abolished,
Congress rather than the Supreme Court ought to strike the final
blow.201 Toward that end, in 2016, several members of Congress introduced, and the House of Representatives passed, SOPRA—the Separation of Powers Restoration Act—which would have amended the
APA with the intent of overturning Chevron.202 A somewhat different
variation of the same proposal was incorporated into the Regulatory
Accountability Act (“RAA”), which the House passed in January
2017.203
Statements by SOPRA’s sponsors indicate that their primary goal
is to eliminate the deferential Chevron standard of review for agency
interpretations of statutes.204 For example, in a March 17, 2016 speech
Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. at 2712 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Id. (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).
198 Id. (quoting Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967,
983 (2005)).
199 Id. at 2712–13.
200 Id. at 2713.
201 See, e.g., Andrew Hessick, Legislative Efforts to Overturn Chevron, YALE J. ON REG.:
NOTICE & COMMENT (Mar. 19, 2016), http://www.yalejreg.com/blog/legislative-efforts-to-overturn-chevron-by-andy-hessick.
202 Separation of Powers Restoration Act of 2016, H.R. 4768, 114th Cong. (2016).
203 Regulatory Accountability Act of 2017, H.R. 5, 115th Cong. (2017).
204 See Amar, supra note 27; Hatch & Ratcliffe, supra note 28 (“In practice, courts read
these terms so broadly as to give federal bureaucrats essentially unbridled power to say what the
law is—oftentimes even if the agency’s interpretation contradicts the plain language of the statute.”); Lee, supra note 28 (“[J]udicial deference to the agencies undercuts the courts’ ability to
hold the government accountable to the law. Our bill restores accountability to the regulatory
process by ensuring that the courts say what the law is, not what the agencies wish the law would
be.”).
196
197

R

R
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in support of SOPRA, Senator Mike Lee stated that Chevron “has
helped to midwife this shadowy fourth branch, by requiring Courts,
under certain circumstances, to surrender their Article III constitutional power of judicial review to executive agencies.”205 Regulated
industries have announced support of SOPRA to prevent agencies
from “expand[ing] the scope of their own regulatory authority.”206 By
contrast, the version of the RAA under consideration in the Senate
does not repudiate or even curtail Chevron.207 Whether SOPRA, in
one version or another, will be enacted into law remains to be seen.
II. CHEVRON’S MANY VERSIONS
The above survey of Chevron’s history demonstrates less that the
doctrine has risen and fallen, but more that it ebbs and flows from
case to case, sometimes but not always to great effect. Chevron has
not dominated administrative law jurisprudence quite as much as lore
would have it. But it definitely has endured and has featured prominently in numerous cases, including relatively recent ones.
A key reason Chevron seems to ebb and flow as it does is that the
jurisprudence and academic literature do not advance a single, unified
understanding of what Chevron deference entails. Rather, they reflect
several competing versions of Chevron, none of which are demonstrably incorrect, and all of which are theoretically defensible. In other
words, Chevron has become a generic label for several variations on a
theme.208 All share the general premise of strong, mandatory judicial
deference to some subset of agency statutory interpretations and some
number of analytical steps—generally two, but not always—for getting to that point. But disagreements over the details abound. And,
depending on which Chevron application one chooses to embrace and
205 Senator Mike Lee, Remarks on Separation of Powers Restoration Act: Ending Chevron
Deference (Mar. 17, 2016), http://www.lee.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2016/3/remarks-on-sepa
ration-of-powers-restoration-act-ending-chevron-deference.
206 Letter from R. Bruce Josten, Exec. Vice President of Gov’t Affairs, U.S. Chamber of
Commerce, to Members of the U.S. Cong. (Mar. 18, 2016), https://www.uschamber.com/sites/
default/files/documents/files/3.18.16-_hill_letter_to_congress_supporting_h.r._4768_and_s._2724_
the_separation_of_powers_restoration_act.pdf; see also CEI Leads Coalition to Support the Separation of Powers Restoration Act, COMPETITIVE ENTERPRISE INST. (June 8, 2016), https://
cei.org/content/cei-leads-coalition-support-separation-powers-restoration-act [https://perma.cc/
2Z9F-33X3].
207

Regulatory Accountability Act of 2017, S. 951, 115th Cong. (2017).

Cf. Allan Erbsen, Erie’s Four Functions: Reframing Choice of Law in Federal Courts, 89
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 579, 581–82 (2013) (arguing that the Erie doctrine’s imprecision and ambiguity have rendered Erie an improper label for choice of law).
208
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follow, Chevron becomes more or less formalistic, more or less textualist, and more or less deferential.
Part of the difficulty stems from the Chevron opinion itself, which
describes the relevant standard of review in highly variable terms, and
thus supports a multiplicity of interpretations.209 Identifying all of
Chevron’s many variations is probably impossible. Regardless, appreciating at least some of the many options is essential to understanding
both the Supreme Court’s Chevron jurisprudence and also efforts to
reshape, restrain, and invalidate Chevron deference.
A. The Original Exposition Raises Questions
The origin of Chevron’s two steps derives easily from the Supreme Court’s assertion in Chevron that “[w]hen a court reviews an
agency’s construction of the statute which it administers, it is confronted with two questions.”210 From there, the Court’s rhetoric becomes murky.
“First,” according to the Court, “is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.”211 A few
sentences later, the Court says that, “[i]f . . . the court determines
Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the
court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute.”212
Based on these two sentences alone, the step one inquiry would seem
both highly textualist and narrowly tailored toward facial specificity.
Few questions of statutory interpretation that rise to the Supreme
Court or even to the federal circuit courts of appeals, however, are
likely to find direct and explicit resolution in the statutory text without
additional inquiry. Consequently, with this framing of the step one
inquiry, one would expect the vast majority of cases to proceed readily
to Chevron’s second step.
In between these two sentences, however, the Court says that,
“[i]f the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the
court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously
expressed intent of Congress.”213 A requirement that a court be able to
identify clear congressional intent arguably contemplates a more robust, and potentially more purposivist, step one inquiry than a requirement that a statute resolve the interpretive difficulty directly and
209
210
211
212
213

See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984).
Id. at 842.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 843 (emphasis added).
Id. at 842–43 (emphasis added).
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precisely. Courts rely on a variety of canons and resources, including
legislative history and statutory purpose, to glean congressional intent
from facially ambiguous statutory text. Moreover, in a footnote to this
sentence, the Court specifies the judiciary as “the final authority on
issues of statutory construction” and declares, “[i]f a court, employing
traditional tools of statutory construction, ascertains that Congress had
an intention on the precise question at issue, that intention is the law
and must be given effect.”214 This footnote, too, obviously contemplates a more robust inquiry than a mere facial check of statutory text.
But the footnote fails to specify which traditional tools of statutory
construction a court ought to consider in attempting to ascertain clear
congressional intent: all of them or merely certain subsets? After all,
in theory as well as practice, the statutory interpretation toolbox includes not only a host of textual canons, legislative history, and statutory purpose, but also substantive canons, like the constitutional
avoidance canon or the rule of lenity, that themselves serve as ambiguity tiebreakers.215
Finally, at the end of that same paragraph in the Chevron opinion, the Court rephrases step one as whether “the statute is silent or
ambiguous with respect to the specific issue.”216 This language seems
to equate statutory silence regarding a particular question with statutory ambiguity. Certainly, in some cases textual silence is indicative of
ambiguity.217 Such was the case in Chevron itself, as the Court found
ambiguity in the fact that neither the Clean Air Act’s text nor its history offered even the merest hint of congressional intent regarding the
“bubble concept” addressed by the regulations at issue in that case.218
But although legislatures will sometimes incorporate exceptions from
statutory requirements explicitly in statutory text, legislatures do not
commonly construct statutes by expressly excluding everything under
the sun that is not included. Hence, the post-Chevron jurisprudence
has seen the emergence of the “elephants in mouseholes” canon:
“Congress . . . does not alter the fundamental details of a regulatory
scheme in vague terms or ancillary provisions—it does not, one might
214

Id. at 843 n.9 (emphasis added).

See infra Section II.B.
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 (emphasis added).
217 See, e.g., Yellow Transp., Inc. v. Michigan, 537 U.S. 36, 45–48 (2002) (finding ambiguity
where a statute “does not foreclose” the agency’s interpretation); see also Nathan Alexander
Sales & Jonathan H. Adler, The Rest Is Silence: Chevron Deference, Agency Jurisdiction, and
Statutory Silences, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1497, 1506–07 (identifying cases in which agencies
claimed that statutory silence gave them the power to regulate).
218 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 851.
215
216
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say, hide elephants in mouseholes.”219 Yet, precisely when statutory
silence shifts from ambiguity to clarity, or vice versa, remains ill-defined at best.220
The Court’s Chevron opinion was hardly clearer in describing
step two. First, the Court said that, at that step, “the question for the
court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.”221 In a footnote to that sentence, the Court
elaborated that a reviewing court “need not conclude that the agency
construction was the only one it permissibly could have adopted to
uphold the [agency’s] construction.”222 In the next paragraph, however, the Court used different rhetoric to describe the deference owed
to “express delegation[s] of authority” and “implicit” ones.223 The former were to be “given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary,
capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute,” while the latter warranted deference if “reasonable.”224 Commentators at times have disagreed over whether the permissibility, controlling weight, and
reasonableness formulations are interchangeable225 or establish different deference standards for different types of interpretations.226 And
because the Court’s use of the phrase “arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute” strongly resembles that of APA section
706(2)(A), commentators also have disagreed over whether judicial
219 Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001); see, e.g., Am. Bar Ass’n v.
FTC, 430 F.3d 457, 468–69 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (employing the canon in concluding that statutory
silence should not be construed as authorization to regulate); see also Jacob Loshin & Aaron
Nielson, Hiding Nondelegation in Mouseholes, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 19, 24–45 (2010) (connecting
the canon’s emergence with Chevron).

See, e.g., Loshin & Nielson, supra note 219; Sales & Adler, supra note 217.
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 (emphasis added).
222 Id. at 843 n.11.
223 Id. at 843–44.
224 Id.
225 See, e.g., Frederick Liu, Chevron as a Doctrine of Hard Cases, 66 ADMIN. L. REV. 285,
315–17 (2014) (arguing for a positivist formulation of step two and rejecting the reasonableness
formulation); Christopher M. Pietruszkiewicz, Discarded Deference: Judicial Independence in Informal Agency Guidance, 74 TENN. L. REV. 1, 31–32 (2006) (equating “permissible” and
“reasonable”).
226 See, e.g., John P.C. Duncan, The Course of Federal Pre-emption of State Banking Law,
18 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 221, 251–52 (1999) (reading Chevron as advocating different standards for different types of delegation); Linda Galler, Emerging Standards for Judicial Review of
IRS Revenue Rulings, 72 B.U. L. REV. 841, 859–60 (1992) (contending that the Chevron opinion
contemplates a more deferential permissibility inquiry for legislative rules and a less deferential
reasonableness inquiry for interpretative rules); J. Lyn Entrikin Goering, Tailoring Deference to
Variety with a Wink and a Nod to Chevron: The Roberts Court and the Amorphous Doctrine of
Judicial Review of Agency Interpretations of Law, 36 J. LEGIS. 18, 45–47 (2010) (suggesting that
Chevron requires less deference for implicit delegations than for explicit ones).
220
221

R
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review under Chevron step two is limited to statutory interpretation227
or extends to considering the agency’s reasons for choosing one interpretation over another.228
Finally, the Chevron opinion alludes to the continued viability of
the contextual factors without affirmatively deciding as much. Citing
Skidmore, the Court noted that the EPA’s interpretation represented
“a reasonable accommodation of manifestly competing interests and
is entitled to deference” because “the regulatory scheme is technical
and complex, the agency considered the matter in a detailed and reasoned fashion, and the decision involves reconciling conflicting policies.”229 The Chevron Court contended further that “[j]udges are not
experts in the field,” and when the interpretation of a statute “really
centers on the wisdom of the agency’s policy,” deference is appropriate.230 These statements harken back to the expertise-based multifactor Skidmore approach, comporting with Justice Stevens’s belief
that Chevron itself did not change the Court’s deference jurisprudence. But if Chevron incorporated Skidmore’s contextual factors, it
left open where in the two-step analysis they fall. And Chevron’s evasion of the issue—intentional or not—has prompted disagreements
among the Justices about whether these factors remain relevant to the
Chevron analysis.231
In summary, Chevron’s own rhetoric supports different expositions of its two steps depending on which snippets of language one
chooses to emphasize. Whenever the Supreme Court announces (or is
perceived as announcing) a new standard or test, some initial confusion is probably inevitable as courts apply that new standard or test in
227 See, e.g., Gary Lawson, Outcome, Procedure and Process: Agency Duties of Explanation
for Legal Conclusions, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 313, 325–26 (1996) (distinguishing Chevron’s statutory inquiry from “process” review under the APA).
228 See, e.g., Galler, supra note 226, at 859–60 (recognizing both interpretations of Chevron
step two); Ronald M. Levin, A Blackletter Statement of Federal Administrative Law, 54 ADMIN.
L. REV. 1, 37–38 (2002) (acknowledging that courts engage in both types of analysis at Chevron
step two); Ronald M. Levin, The Anatomy of Chevron: Step Two Reconsidered, 72 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 1253, 1268–69 (1997) [hereinafter Levin, Anatomy of Chevron]; Randolph J. May, Defining
Deference Down, Again: Independent Agencies, Chevron Deference, and Fox, 62 ADMIN. L. REV.
433, 434 n.5 (2010) (contending that “most scholars” take this view).
229 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865 (footnotes omitted) (citing Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S.
134, 140 (1944)).
230 Id. at 865–66.
231 Compare Christensen v. Harris Cty., 529 U.S. 576, 589–90 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment) (“Skidmore deference to authoritative agency views is
an anachronism . . . . That era came to an end with our watershed decision in Chevron . . . .”),
with id. at 596 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Chevron made no relevant change [to the Court’s deference jurisprudence].”).

R
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subsequent cases.232 But many of Chevron’s nuances remain almost as
unclear today as they did thirty years ago, as the Court, for the most
part, has done little to resolve the specifics of Chevron’s two steps
directly.233 As a result, courts and commentators have embraced and
advocated different variations on Chevron’s theme.
B. Which Tools of Statutory Interpretation, and When?
No matter the variation, Chevron entails at least some independent evaluation of statutory meaning. Depending on which language
from Chevron one wants to highlight, however, that assessment may
range anywhere from exceedingly shallow to incredibly robust.
At times, both textualists and purposivists have argued in favor of
aggressively seeking statutory clarity under Chevron using the methods and tools that courts have always used when evaluating statutory
meaning. Consistent with his more general adherence to textualism,
Justice Scalia repeatedly called for a rigorous judicial defense of statutory limits through textualist reasoning.234 Likewise, consistent with
his own, more purposivist leanings, Justice Breyer has proposed a
more thorough appraisal of statutory text, purpose, and legislative history, along with contextual factors like consistency, in discerning
under Chevron whether Congress intended to give agencies discretionary space.235 No matter the methodology, a robust Chevron step
one analysis that utilizes a wider array of interpretive tools affords
judges more room to find statutory clarity.236 If courts readily find
statutory meaning to be clear, then they turn less often to deference.
Nevertheless, courts and scholars have clashed over which interpretive tools ought to be applied at Chevron step one versus step two.
For example, the Supreme Court has been inconsistent in its use of
legislative history in Chevron analysis. The Court in the Chevron opinion itself discussed legislative history at some length, despite finding it
inconclusive.237 In several subsequent cases, the Court relied heavily
See, e.g., supra notes 43–77 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 78–184 and accompanying text.
234 See, e.g., City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1874–75 (2013); Scalia, supra note
56, at 521 (observing that a “strict constructionist” like himself, “who finds more often . . . that
the meaning of a statute is apparent from its text and from its relationship with other laws,
thereby finds less often that the triggering requirement for Chevron deference exists”).
235 City of Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1876 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
236 Cf. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984) (“If
a court, employing traditional tools of statutory construction, ascertains that Congress had an
intention on the precise question at issue, that intention is the law and must be given effect.”).
237 Id. at 851–53, 862.
232
233

R
R
R
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on legislative history to find statutory clarity at Chevron step one.238 In
other instances, however, the Court has framed Chevron’s first step
rhetorically in purely textualist terms and ignored legislative history in
its analysis.239 For example, in Mayo Foundation for Medical Education & Research v. United States,240 Chief Justice Roberts, writing for
all participating Justices, completely ignored the parties’ observations
regarding legislative history in concluding that the statute’s meaning
was ambiguous,241 leading some courts and commentators to wonder
whether the Court regarded legislative history as relevant to Chevron
step one analysis.242
The Court’s inconsistent use of legislative history in Chevron
analysis may derive from the Justices’ varying attitudes toward legislative history in general.243 Regardless, the circuits are now divided over
when in the Chevron framework to consider legislative history. Most
circuits will readily consider legislative history at Chevron step one.244
But the Third Circuit does not examine legislative history at step
238 See, e.g., FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133–59 (2000); see
also Eskridge & Baer, supra note 119, at 1136 (demonstrating that the Court applies legislative
history in 62.3% of cases).

R

239 See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defs. of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 665 (2007)
(describing Chevron deference as “appropriate only where ‘Congress has not directly addressed
the precise question at issue’ through the statutory text” (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843)).
240

562 U.S. 44 (2011).

Compare id. (resolving the case without mentioning legislative history), with Brief for
Petitioners at 38–39, Mayo Found., 562 U.S. 44 (No. 09-837) (discussing legislative history in
support of position), and Brief for the United States at 24–25, Mayo Found., 562 U.S. 44 (No. 09837) (same). Justice Kagan abstained from the Mayo Foundation case.
241

242 See, e.g., Carpenter Family Invs., LLC v. Comm’r, 136 T.C. 373, 389 (2011) (writing after
Mayo Foundation that the Court “appears to frown upon the use of legislative history at step
one of a Chevron analysis”); Joana Que, Note, The State of Treasury Regulatory Authority After
Mayo Foundation: Arguing for an Intentionalist Approach at Chevron Step One, 85 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1413, 1423 (2012); see also Irving Salem, Mayo Dissected: Some Dragons Slain, Some Still
Breathing Fire, 130 TAX NOTES 1327, 1328–29 (2011).
243 See Jellum, Chevron’s Demise, supra note 37, at 771 (making this observation); see also
Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal
Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 31 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) (“I object to the use of legislative history
on principle . . . .”).
244 See, e.g., Sierra Club v. EPA, 781 F.3d 299, 308 (6th Cir. 2015); BNSF Ry. Co. v. United
States, 775 F.3d 743, 755 n.87 (5th Cir. 2015); Kingdomware Techs., Inc. v. United States, 754
F.3d 923, 931 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Sumpter v. Sec’y of Labor, 763 F.3d 1292, 1297 (11th Cir. 2014);
Ron Peterson Firearms, LLC. v. Jones, 760 F.3d 1147, 1157 n.10 (10th Cir. 2014); Santana v.
Holder, 731 F.3d 50, 55 (1st Cir. 2013); WPIX, Inc. v. IVI, Inc., 691 F.3d 275, 279 (2d Cir. 2012);
Schafer v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 49, 57 (4th Cir. 2011); Catawba Cty. v. EPA, 571 F.3d 20, 35 (D.C.
Cir. 2009); North Dakota ex rel. Olson v. Ctr. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., 403 F.3d 537, 539
(8th Cir. 2005).

R
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one.245 Rather, the Third Circuit restricts its analysis at that stage to
textual tools such as semantic canons, statutory structure, and dictionaries.246 The Seventh Circuit similarly defers consideration of legislative history to Chevron step two.247 The difference in approach may
not matter much to an ardent textualist who eschews legislative history in any event. But for a judge who relies more often on legislative
history as an interpretive tool, and who also takes seriously the comparatively deferential posture of Chevron’s second step, waiting to
consider legislative history might change the outcome in a hard case.
The courts have also expressed uncertainty regarding the relationship between substantive canons and Chevron’s two-step framework.248 Supreme Court precedent is quite clear that the constitutional
avoidance canon trumps Chevron deference. In Edward J. DeBartolo
Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building & Construction Trades Council,249 the Supreme Court expressly rejected the agency’s interpretation in favor of one that avoided “serious constitutional questions,”
notwithstanding that the agency’s interpretation “would normally be
entitled to deference unless that construction were clearly contrary to
the intent of Congress” under Chevron.250 Likewise, in Solid Waste
Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States Army Corps of Engineers,251 the Court refused to defer to the agency’s regulation specifically because it raised “significant constitutional questions.”252 By
245 See United States v. Geiser, 527 F.3d 288, 294 (3d Cir. 2008) (“[L]egislative history
should not be considered at Chevron step one.”). The Third Circuit, however, does permit judges
to consider legislative history at step two to determine “whether the agency made ‘a reasonable
policy choice’ in its interpretation.” See Am. Farm Bureau Fed’n v. EPA, 792 F.3d 281, 307 (3d
Cir. 2015) (quoting Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967,
997 (2005)).
246 Geiser, 527 F.3d at 294–98. The Third Circuit claimed that the Supreme Court had “returned to its original mode of analysis, which does not include a consideration of legislative
history at Chevron step one.” Id. at 293 (citing Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t of Educ., 127
S. Ct. 1534, 1543 (2007)).
247 See, e.g., Coyomani-Cielo v. Holder, 758 F.3d 908, 914 (7th Cir. 2014) (acknowledging
that “some of our sister circuits consider legislative history at [Chevron step one], but we prefer
to save that inquiry for Chevron’s second step”); Emergency Servs. Billing Corp. v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 668 F.3d 459, 465 (7th Cir. 2012) (“In this Circuit, ‘we seem to lean toward reserving consideration of legislative history and other appropriate factors until the second Chevron step.’ ”
(quoting Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. United States, 142 F.3d 973, 983 (7th Cir. 1998))).
248 See Kenneth A. Bamberger, Normative Canons in the Review of Administrative Policymaking, 118 YALE L.J. 64, 70–84 (2008) (outlining the competing arguments).
249

485 U.S. 568 (1988).

250

Id. at 574, 588.

251

531 U.S. 159 (2001).

252

Id. at 174.
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comparison, in Rancheria v. Jewell,253 the Ninth Circuit refused to apply the Indian canon in lieu of Chevron because “the Blackfeet presumption is merely a ‘guideline,’ whereas ‘Chevron is a substantive
rule of law.’”254
Meanwhile, conflicting Supreme Court precedents have left an
ongoing debate over whether “Chevron still leaves some place for the
rule of lenity,” particularly, although not exclusively, when a regulatory statute provides for both civil and criminal enforcement.255 In
1995, in Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great
Oregon,256 the Court suggested that Chevron deference trumps the
rule of lenity, at least when considering notice-and-comment regulations.257 “We have never suggested that the rule of lenity should provide the standard for reviewing facial challenges to administrative
regulations whenever the governing statute authorizes criminal enforcement,” said the Court.258 Some courts have expressed concern
that lenity and Chevron are simply incompatible—that allowing for
lenity in reviewing a particular statute would obviate Chevron for that
context.259
But the Supreme Court has occasionally applied the rule of lenity
in noncriminal contexts where the statute had both criminal and noncriminal applications, albeit with no mention of Chevron.260 Judge Jeffrey Sutton of the Sixth Circuit has articulated at some length the case
for applying the rule of lenity rather than Chevron when an agency
interpretation might later support criminal prosecution.261 In 2014, in a
statement accompanying the Court’s denial of certiorari in Whitman v.
253

776 F.3d 706 (9th Cir. 2015).

254

Id. at 713 (quoting Williams v. Babbitt, 115 F.3d 657, 663 n.5 (9th Cir. 1997)).

255

Espinal-Andrades v. Holder, 777 F.3d 163, 170 (4th Cir. 2015).

256

515 U.S. 687 (1995).

257

See id. at 704 n.18.

258

Id.

See, e.g., Ruiz-Almanzar v. Ridge, 485 F.3d 193, 198 (2d Cir. 2007) (“It cannot be the
case . . . that the doctrine of lenity must be applied whenever there is an ambiguity in an immigration statute because, if that were true, it would supplant the application of Chevron in the
immigration context.”).
259

260 See Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 11 n.8 (2004) (applying lenity in the immigration
context); United States v. Thompson/Ctr. Arms Co., 504 U.S. 505, 517–18 (1992) (declining to
defer to the agency’s interpretation in a tax case).
261 See Esquivel-Quintana v. Lynch, 810 F.3d 1019, 1027–32 (6th Cir. 2016) (Sutton, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that lenity must apply to statutes supporting both
criminal and civil enforcement); Carter v. Welles-Bowen Realty, Inc., 736 F.3d 722, 730–32 (6th
Cir. 2013) (Sutton, J., concurring) (“[T]he rule of lenity forbids deference to the executive
branch’s interpretation of a crime-creating law.”).
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United States,262 Justice Scalia called for the Court to consider whether
courts “owe deference to an executive agency’s interpretation of a law
that contemplates both criminal and administrative enforcement,” and
suggested further that “[u]ndoubtedly Congress may make it a crime
to violate a regulation, but it is quite a different matter for Congress
to give agencies—let alone for us to presume that Congress gave agencies—power to resolve ambiguities in criminal legislation.”263
Supposing substantive canons are part of Chevron analysis, do
they apply at step one or step two?264 Substantive canons often operate as ambiguity tie breakers. Thus, if a reviewing court applies a substantive canon at Chevron step one, then presumably the court will be
more likely to find the meaning of the statute to be clear as it assumes
Congress intended the statute to be interpreted in accordance with the
policy concern of the canon. If applied at step one, therefore, substantive canons may, indeed, render Chevron de facto inapplicable in certain regulatory contexts, such as immigration265 or Indian affairs.266
If substantive canons apply at step two, however, Chevron presumably would trump the canon because the court could feel compelled to defer to an agency interpretation deemed reasonable but for
its clash with the canon’s policy presumption.267 In Morales-Izquierdo
v. Gonzales,268 Judge Alex Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit refused to
apply the avoidance canon and instead analyzed deference and consti262

135 S. Ct. 352 (2014).

263

Id. at 353 (Scalia, J., respecting the denial of certiorari) (citation omitted).

See Olmos v. Holder, 780 F.3d 1313, 1320–24 (10th Cir. 2015) (addressing lenity and
constitutional avoidance at step two); Navarro v. Encino Motorcars, LLC, 780 F.3d 1267, 1271
(9th Cir. 2015) (applying the presumption that the Fair Labor Standards Act should be construed
in favor of employees at step one), vacated, 136 S. Ct. 2117 (2016); Florez v. Holder, 779 F.3d
207, 213 (2d Cir. 2015) (examining lenity outside of the two-step framework); Espinal-Andrades
v. Holder, 777 F.3d 163, 169–70 (4th Cir. 2015) (examining lenity outside of the two-step framework, but noting that it only applies where a statute is ambiguous); Rancheria v. Jewell, 776 F.3d
706, 712–13 (9th Cir. 2015) (examining the Blackfeet canon outside of the two-step framework,
but noting that it only applies “where a statute is not clear”).
264

265

See, e.g., Ruiz-Almanzar v. Ridge, 485 F.3d 193, 198 (2d Cir. 2007); Florez, 779 F.3d at

213.
266 See, e.g., Cobell v. Norton, 240 F.3d 1081, 1100–02 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (explaining its decision to apply the Indian affairs canon rather than Chevron to resolve statutory ambiguity); Williams v. Babbitt, 115 F.3d 657, 663 n.5 (9th Cir. 1997) (noting that what the court calls the
Blackfeet canon must give way to Chevron).
267 At least one scholar has suggested that substantive canons should apply as a post-Chevron inquiry, after a finding of ambiguity and unreasonableness, as a justification for the court’s
own interpretation. See David S. Rubenstein, Putting the Immigration Rule of Lenity in Its
Proper Place: A Tool of Last Resort After Chevron, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 479, 517–19 (2007).
268

486 F.3d 484 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc).
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tutional implications separately.269 Dissenting, Judge Sidney Thomas
argued that the avoidance canon applies at Chevron step one.270 According to Judge Thomas, the avoidance canon is “unquestionably a
‘traditional tool of statutory interpretation’ that may and should be
used to determine whether Congress intended to preclude the
agency’s chosen interpretation.”271 In summary, the placement of substantive canons within Chevron analysis may in some cases serve as a
barometer for how rigorously a court will assess statutory meaning for
itself or how readily a court will defer.
C. Deliberative Democracy and a Syncopated Chevron
The courts’ case-by-case engagement with Chevron typically
makes their doctrinal analysis more than a little fragmented. Given
the multiplicity of Chevron cases, it is unsurprising that legal scholars
have attempted to bring coherence to that jurisprudence, both by finding commonalities among existing cases but also in advocating for particular views of how Chevron ought to function.
In 1994, Mark Seidenfeld articulated an argument for what he
dubbed “a syncopated Chevron,” based on the proposition that Chevron should view “agencies as a means of fostering public deliberation
about government policy choices.”272 Drawing from the Chevron opinion’s emphasis on agencies as policymakers, Seidenfeld premised his
claim on a theory of “deliberative democracy,” which “views politics
as a process by which members of society seek both to define the public interest and to determine the best way to further that interest.”273
According to Seidenfeld, to promote legitimacy, government must represent the perspectives and values of all members of society and seek
to persuade dissenters to adopt the view most beneficial to the whole
of society.274 Agencies provide this discourse by allowing “public participation, political influence, and reasoned decisionmaking.”275
269 Id. at 492–98 (“When Congress has explicitly or implicitly left a gap for an agency to fill,
and the agency has filled it, we have no authority to re-construe the statute, even to avoid potential constitutional problems; we can only decide whether the agency’s interpretation reflects a
plausible reading of the statutory text. . . . [C]onstitutional avoidance . . . plays no role in the
second Chevron inquiry.”).
270 Id. at 503–05 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
271 Id. at 504.
272 Mark Seidenfeld, A Syncopated Chevron: Emphasizing Reasoned Decisionmaking in
Reviewing Agency Interpretations of Statutes, 73 TEX. L. REV. 83, 87 (1994).
273 Id. at 125.
274 Id. at 126.
275 Id.
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Seidenfeld argued that Chevron could best effectuate the goals of
deliberative democracy by emphasizing step two over step one.276
Consequently, he favored a minimalist, textualist, and highly deferential Chevron step one.277 As judges should not make policy choices, he
argued, they should find statutory silence or ambiguity under step one
“unless the statute clearly manifests congressional intent to constrain
agency discretion, as opposed to merely providing guidance on the
substantive regulatory issues the statute addresses.”278 At Chevron
step two, Seidenfeld suggested that courts apply a variation of hard
look review. Under traditional hard look review, derived from the Supreme Court’s decision in State Farm, courts must reject agency action
as “arbitrary and capricious” when the agency in question “entirely
failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the
agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.”279 By comparison,
Seidenfeld’s Chevron step two would “require the agency to identify
the concerns that the statute addresses and explain how the agency’s
interpretation took those concerns into account.”280 Thus, Chevron
would require an agency to explain how its interpretation effectuates
statutory goals. Courts would then rely on traditional tools, including
legislative history and canons of construction, not to discern statutory
meaning, but to evaluate the agency’s assessment of statutory purposes and, with that focus, the reasonableness of its interpretive
choice.281
Seidenfeld’s syncopated Chevron thus would leave more interpretive questions to agencies, even if “the agency has only an indirect role
in administering the statute, so long as the agency procedures encourage discourse about the implications of potential interpretations.”282 Correspondingly, the syncopated model essentially discards
the traditional understanding of courts as the primary interpreters of
statutory meaning.283 Rather, as judges have often said regarding their
own efforts at statutory interpretation, if Congress disagrees with an
276
277
278
279

Id. at 127.
See id. at 127–28.
Id. at 128.
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43

(1983).
280
281
282
283

Seidenfeld, supra note 272, at 129.
Id. at 129–30.
Id. at 133–34.
Id. at 137.
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agency’s interpretation of a statute, then Congress can either pass
overriding legislation to reverse agency decisionmaking or threaten to
constrain the agency’s budget.284
Many cases arguably apply Chevron in a manner consistent with
Seidenfeld’s syncopated model. For example, almost any opinion that
makes short work of finding ambiguity at Chevron step one, but then
finds the agency’s interpretation unreasonable at Chevron step two,
arguably reflects Seidenfeld’s approach—although he might contend
that the court asked the wrong questions at step two if its analysis was
textual rather than policy oriented.285
By limiting Chevron’s first step to a purely textual inquiry and
deferring consideration of legislative history to Chevron step two, the
Third and Seventh Circuits arguably dance more in step with
Seidenfeld’s syncopated rhythm. Describing Chevron analysis in one
recent case, for example, the Third Circuit framed step one as
“whether the statute unambiguously forbids the Agency’s interpretation,” and step two as “whether [the agency] made ‘a reasonable policy choice’ in reaching its interpretation.”286 It then said it would
consider legislative history at step one solely for the purpose of “clarify[ing] the policies framing the statute.”287 Although the court’s step
one analysis was extensive, reviewing arguments concerning the statute’s text and purpose along with substantive canons, its way of thinking about the task at hand resembles Seidenfeld’s vision.288 Similarly, a
key Seventh Circuit discussion of the Chevron framework clearly anticipated more extensive step two than step one analysis:
While this circuit has examined legislative history during
the first step of Chevron, we now seem to lean toward reserving consideration of legislative history and other appropriate factors until the second Chevron step. In the second
step, the court determines whether the regulation harmonizes with the language, origins, and purpose of the statute.
While not dispositive, a court may find various considerations informative—these considerations might include the
consistency of the agency’s interpretation, the contemporaId. at 136.
Id. at 132 (suggesting as much of the court’s reasoning in Northern Natural Gas Co. v.
FERC, 827 F.2d 779 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (en banc)).
286 Am. Farm Bureau Fed’n v. EPA, 792 F.3d 281, 294–95 (3d Cir. 2015) (first quoting
Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 218 (2002); then quoting Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v.
Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 986 (2005)).
287 Id. at 307.
288 See id. at 295–306.
284
285
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neousness of the interpretation, and the robustness of the
regulation following congressional re-enactment of the underlying statute.289
In Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers International Union v.
NLRB,290 the D.C. Circuit cited Seidenfeld’s work and seemed to adhere rather closely to his theory of Chevron.291 The case concerned a
National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) interpretation of the National Labor Relations Act292 as prohibiting an employer from permanently replacing workers engaged in a work stoppage based on a
good-faith belief that their working conditions are abnormally dangerous.293 Although the court rejected the agency’s interpretation of the
statute under Chevron,294 its analysis avoided any discussion of the
statute’s text or legislative history. Rather, expressing “no doubt that
Congress delegated authority” to the NLRB to interpret the statute,
the court declared, “The only question here is whether the [NLRB]
has articulated a defensible policy.”295 To facilitate its Chevron step
two analysis, the court required the agency to articulate “the rationale
underlying an agency’s construction of the statute.”296 The problem
for the court, and the reason it rejected the agency’s interpretation,
was that the NLRB’s members had not been able to agree on a single
rationale for its interpretation.297
D. Step Two and Traditional Hard Look Review
Several years after Chevron, Ronald Levin professed at a panel
discussion that he preferred a robust step one in which the court extracts “all the guidance that it can possibly get out of the statute,”
fearing that Chevron would dismember the judicial role in agency interpretation.298 A decade later, Levin rejoiced as courts continued to
289 Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. United States, 142 F.3d 973, 983 (7th Cir. 1998) (citations
omitted); see also Emergency Servs. Billing Corp. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 668 F.3d 459, 465–66 (7th
Cir. 2012) (“[T]he only questions we must answer in the first step of Chevron are whether the
statutory language to be interpreted, on its face, is ambiguous, and whether Congress was silent
regarding that ambiguity.”).
290 46 F.3d 82 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
291 Id. at 89 (citing Seidenfeld, supra note 272).
292 National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2012)).
293 Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers, 46 F.3d at 84.
294 Id. at 88–89.
295 Id. at 90.
296 Id.
297 Id. at 91.
298 Judicial Review of Administrative Action in a Conservative Era, supra note 60, at 376
(statement of Ronald M. Levin).

R

R

\\jciprod01\productn\G\GWN\85-5\GWN502.txt

1432

unknown

Seq: 41

THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

14-NOV-17

9:57

[Vol. 85:1392

apply “critical judicial scrutiny” to agency interpretations.299 Rather
than displacing traditional statutory interpretation and deference, he
said, Chevron provided a “manageable framework.”300
Levin recognized, however, that a court’s inquiry at Chevron step
two would be influenced by how the court chose to approach step one.
If one contemplates a robust Chevron step one analysis utilizing the
full array of traditional tools of statutory construction, one could argue that the only analysis remaining to be performed at step two is
whether the agency’s interpretation is absurd301—and even then, some
courts will apply the absurdity canon at step one to discount patently
absurd interpretations.302
As a proponent of a robust Chevron step one seeking content for
Chevron step two beyond a mere absurdity inquiry, Levin advocated
merging Chevron step two with traditional hard look review.303 According to Levin, employing hard look review at Chevron step two
would ensure that agencies rationalize their decisions from a policymaking perspective.304 Moreover, he contended, attempts to differentiate Chevron step two and hard look review create “excess
baggage,” resulting in judicial inefficiency.305
Numerous circuit court opinions, most notably though not exclusively from the D.C. Circuit, correspond with Levin’s model.306 One of
the first D.C. Circuit cases to apply Chevron’s two steps, Rettig v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp.,307 is consistent with Levin’s approach.
Writing for the court, Judge Patricia Wald conducted an extensive step
one analysis that considered statutory text, legislative conference reSee Levin, Anatomy of Chevron, supra note 228, at 1259.
Id.
301 See id. at 1290–91.
302 See, e.g., Eagle Broad. Grp., Ltd. v. FCC, 563 F.3d 543, 552 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Mova
Pharm. Corp. v. Shalala, 140 F.3d 1060, 1068 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (“The rule that statutes are to be
read to avoid absurd results allows an agency to establish that seemingly clear statutory language
does not reflect the ‘unambiguously expressed intent of Congress,’ and thus to overcome the first
step of the Chevron analysis.” (citation omitted)); Bower v. Fed. Express Corp., 96 F.3d 200,
207–08 (6th Cir. 1996).
303 See Levin, Anatomy of Chevron, supra note 228, at 1266–79; see also supra notes 279–81
and accompanying text (describing traditional hard look review as distinguished from Mark
Seidenfeld’s syncopated Chevron version).
304 Levin, Anatomy of Chevron, supra note 228, at 1270.
305 Id. at 1296.
306 See, e.g., Citizens Coal Council v. EPA, 447 F.3d 879, 889 n.10 (6th Cir. 2006) (“We
recognize that there is support for the proposition that in review of rulemaking the second step
of Chevron indeed amounts to the same inquiry as arbitrary or capricious review under the
APA.”).
307 744 F.2d 133 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
299
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300
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ports, subsequent statutory amendments, and Supreme Court precedent, concluding that the court was “unable to characterize” the
evidence before it “as entirely clear and unambiguous” evidence of
congressional intent.308 Judge Wald then contemplated the potential
overlap between State Farm and Chevron analysis, noting that step
two might either ask whether the agency properly interpreted the statute or whether the agency’s interpretation was arbitrary and capricious under the APA.309 The court ultimately declined to extend
Chevron deference because the agency failed to “provide some basis
in the record for [the court] to conclude that the agency ‘considered
the matter in a detailed and reasoned fashion,’ and made a reasonable
decision.”310 Numerous subsequent D.C. Circuit opinions equate State
Farm and Chevron step two,311 although others expressly reject merging the two standards.312 Even more notably, as described earlier, the
Supreme Court seems to be gravitating toward blending Chevron step
two with State Farm’s traditional hard look review in some cases,
though without quite acknowledging as much.313
E. One-Step Chevron
Drawing partly from Levin’s study of Chevron step two, Matthew
Stephenson and Adrian Vermeule have proposed that Chevron redundantly and “artificially divides one inquiry into two steps.”314 If Chevron step two asks whether or not the agency’s interpretation is a
permissible construction of the statute, then step one is redundant
with step two. Indeed, courts could decide many Chevron issues at
either step and reach the same result.315 If, however, step two evaluId. at 142–50.
Id. at 150–51, 151 n.46 (“We must admit to some doubts about such a distinction.”).
310 Id. at 156 (citation omitted) (quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984)).
311 See, e.g., Shays v. FEC, 414 F.3d 76, 96–97 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (citing several circuit precedents as conflating Chevron step two with arbitrary and capricious review under State Farm).
312 See, e.g., Stilwell v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 569 F.3d 514, 519 (D.C. Cir. 2009)
(“[T]his is a State Farm case, not a Chevron case.”); Republican Nat’l Comm. v. FEC, 76 F.3d
400, 407 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (conceding that the two standards “overlap[] somewhat” but contending that “a permissible statutory construction under Chevron is not always reasonable under
State Farm”); Arent v. Shalala, 70 F.3d 610, 615–16 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (explaining the analytical
distinction between Chevron and State Farm).
313 See supra Section I.C.
314 Matthew C. Stephenson & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron Has Only One Step, 95 VA. L.
REV. 597, 599 (2009).
315 See, e.g., INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 448–49 (1987) (recognizing statutory
term as containing “some ambiguity” but holding that the agency’s interpretation was “incorrect” with reasoning that could be characterized readily as either Chevron step one or step two);
308
309
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ates the process of the agency’s interpretive decisionmaking, then step
two is redundant with State Farm. Stephenson and Vermeule label
these clashes “the doctrinal equivalent of musical chairs.”316
Thus, Stephenson and Vermeule argue that Chevron has only one
step: “[W]hether the agency’s construction is permissible as a matter
of statutory interpretation.”317 Under the one-step approach, the reviewing court employs traditional tools of interpretation to identify
the “zone of ambiguity” in which all permissible interpretations of a
statute may fall.318 If the agency’s interpretation falls within this zone,
the court must defer to the interpretation under Chevron.319 Otherwise, if the agency’s interpretation falls outside the range of permissible interpretations, the court must strike down the interpretation.320 In
the latter case, Stephenson and Vermeule claim the denial of deference can be framed as either a step one outcome—that the statute
“unambiguously prohibits the agency’s interpretation”—or as a step
two outcome—that the interpretation is unreasonable.321
Some judges seem amenable to this condensed framework. Many
cases do not delineate two steps in their application of Chevron to
agency interpretations.322 For that matter, cases that frame the Chevron inquiry as whether an agency’s interpretation is foreclosed by the
statute, and conclude without inquiring into policy alternatives that an
interpretation not foreclosed by the statute is reasonable, arguably
embrace the one-step model by failing to conceptualize two separate,
meaningful inquiries.323
In a footnote in United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC,
citing Stephenson and Vermeule’s article, Justice Scalia contended:
“Step 1” has never been an essential part of Chevron analysis. Whether a particular statute is ambiguous makes no difference if the interpretation adopted by the agency is clearly
reasonable—and it would be a waste of time to conduct that
inquiry. The same would be true if the agency interpretation
is clearly beyond the scope of any conceivable ambiguity. It
see also id. at 453–55 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (criticizing the majority’s muddling
of Chevron’s two steps).
316 Stephenson & Vermeule, supra note 314, at 604.
317 Id. at 599.
318 Id. at 598–602.
319 Id.
320 Id.
321 Id.
322 See, e.g., INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 448–49 (1987).
323 See, e.g., Yellow Transp., Inc. v. Michigan, 537 U.S. 36, 45 (2002); see also supra notes
94–95 and accompanying text (discussing Yellow Transportation).
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does not matter whether the word “yellow” is ambiguous
when the agency has interpreted it to mean “purple.”324
Subsequently, in United States v. Garcia-Santana,325 Judge Marsha
Berzon of the Ninth Circuit cited Justice Scalia’s footnote for the proposition that “the Supreme Court has authorized courts to omit evaluation of statutory ambiguity on the ground that, ‘if Congress has
directly spoken to an issue then any agency interpretation contradicting what Congress has said would be unreasonable.’”326 Similarly,
in Friends of the Everglades v. South Florida Water Management District,327 Judge Ed Carnes of the Eleventh Circuit cited Stephenson and
Vermeule to support that Chevron’s two steps are “obviously intertwined,” although he still bifurcated his opinion between steps one
and two.328 Overall, empirical analysis of decisions from the federal
circuit courts of appeals suggests that those courts may apply a onestep Chevron in roughly one quarter of cases.329
The one-step view of Chevron has its critics. Kenneth Bamberger
and Peter Strauss argue, for example, that courts thinking of Chevron
as having only one step will not distinguish between mandatory and
permissible interpretations of the statute.330 Yet, this distinction is
often meaningful. For example, under the Supreme Court’s holding in
Brand X, the agency has the authority to change its interpretation if a
reviewing court has not previously found the meaning of a statute
clear at Chevron step one.331 “[A] judicial precedent holding that a
particular interpretation is either required or precluded fixes statutory
meaning to that extent, foreclosing future agency constructions to the
324 United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 566 U.S. 478, 493 n.1 (2012) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (citation omitted) (citing Stephenson &
Vermeule, supra note 314, at 599).
325 774 F.3d 528 (9th Cir. 2014).
326 Id. at 542 (quoting Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208, 218 n.4 (2009)); see
also Home Concrete & Supply, 566 U.S. at 493 n.1 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment).
327 570 F.3d 1210 (11th Cir. 2009).
328 Id. at 1218–28 (citing Stephenson & Vermeule, supra note 314) (“Having concluded that
the statutory language is ambiguous, our final issue is whether the EPA’s regulation . . . is a
permissible construction of that language.”).
329 See Kerr, supra note 97, at 30 (observing that 28% of federal circuit court decisions
applying Chevron in 1995 and 1996 followed a one-step model); Richard M. Re, Should Chevron
Have Two Steps?, 89 IND. L.J. 605, 638 (2014) (finding that federal circuit courts used a one-step
Chevron in 22% of cases decided in 2011).
330 See Kenneth A. Bamberger & Peter L. Strauss, Chevron’s Two Steps, 95 VA. L. REV.
611 (2009).
331 Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982–83
(2005).
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contrary.”332 Yet Chevron stands for the proposition that the agency
decides how to interpret the statute and the court only intervenes to
the extent that (1) a particular interpretation is mandatory or (2) the
agency has adopted an unreasonable interpretation.333 Thus, Bamberger and Strauss maintain, the one-step model of Chevron would
seem to undercut the reasoning of Brand X by curtailing the instances
in which an agency would perceive itself as having the power to adopt
an alternative interpretation.
F. Flipping Chevron’s Two Steps
As a response to Stephenson and Vermeule’s one-step approach
and its critics, Richard Re has developed yet another theory of Chevron’s two steps that, in essence, reverses the order of step one and step
two.334 Under this approach, the court first asks whether or not the
agency’s interpretation is reasonable.335 If the court finds that the interpretation is reasonable, the court then has discretion to address
whether or not the statute mandates that interpretation.336 Re defends
the optional two-step approach because it removes the redundancy of
some formalist approaches to Chevron but avoids the arguable conflict with Brand X generated by the one-step approach described by
Stephenson and Vermeule.337
Qualitatively, Re draws examples from cases in which the Supreme Court has deferred to the agency’s interpretation without deciding whether the statute mandates the agency’s interpretation.338 In
Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C.339 the Court deferred to the agency’s
interpretation under Chevron as a permissible interpretation of the
statute but refused to address whether the statute mandated the
Bamberger & Strauss, supra note 330, at 616.
See id. at 617 (“Thus, under Brand X, when a court holds that an agency construction is
impermissible because it exceeds the scope of interpretive authority assigned to the agency by
reason of statutory ambiguity, the court should not go on to offer its views of the best way to
resolve statutory meaning. Its role as ‘decider’ has been exhausted.”).
334 Re, supra note 329, at 619. Re is not the only scholar to have proposed flipping Chevron’s two steps. See Richard Murphy, The Last Should Be First—Flip the Order of the Chevron
Two-Step, 22 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 431 (2013).
335 Re, supra note 329, at 619.
336 Id.
337 See id. at 625.
338 Id. at 634–35; see also Holder v. Martinez Gutierrez, 566 U.S. 583, 591 (2012) (“We
think the BIA’s view on imputation meets [the Chevron] standard, and so need not decide if the
statute permits any other construction.”); Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., 566 U.S. 541, 545
(2012).
339 566 U.S. 541 (2012).
332
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agency’s interpretation.340 Moreover, Re reinforces his prescriptive
formulation with empirical data demonstrating that appellate courts
already switch between a one- and two-step approach to Chevron,
suggesting that one of the steps is optional.341 While Re finds support
for the optional two-step approach in the current practices of the Supreme Court and federal circuit courts of appeals, he acknowledges
that no court has identified the approach as such.342 The optional twostep approach is, perhaps, more of a normative ideal than an identifiable approach. In cases where the court does not exercise the optional
second step, the optional two-step approach would be indistinguishable from the one-step approach. Similarly, cases applying the optional step may appear as a traditional Chevron analysis. Nevertheless,
Re offers at minimum a prescriptive approach that some judges may
already embrace, even if he lacks qualitative comparisons between the
cases of individual judges to identify its preexisting usage.
G. Justice Breyer’s Blended Deference Doctrine
Overall, Chevron’s scholarly variations maintain the formalistic
structure of Chevron’s two steps. Justice Breyer, however, breaks the
two-step mold. Instead, Justice Breyer is a strong advocate for a rather
idiosyncratic approach to Chevron review. According to Justice
Breyer, “Chevron made no relevant change” to the multifactor, contextual analysis of Skidmore.343 Rather, Chevron merely added an additional consideration to Skidmore—namely, whether Congress
delegated interpretive authority to the agency.344 Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion in Brand X similarly emphasizes not the “force of
law” language from Mead, but focuses on the “variety of indicators
that Congress would expect Chevron deference.”345 He goes on to
340 Id. at 545 (“[E]ven if the SSA’s longstanding interpretation is not the only reasonable
one, it is at least a permissible construction that garners the Court’s respect under
Chevron . . . .”).
341 Re, supra note 329, at 634–35. We are not entirely convinced by the presentation of Re’s
data as a descriptive tool. It appears to rely on the notion that there is a uniform application of
Chevron. If an individual judge utilizes both one-step and two-step Chevron depending on the
context, it would certainly support Re’s contentions of an optional-step Chevron. Re, however,
does not identify any such judges. Alternatively, his data may reveal the panoply of Chevron’s
variations, with some judges preferring a one-step approach and others a two-step approach.
Nevertheless, Re’s optional two-step approach remains prescriptively viable.
342 Id. at 642.
343 See Christensen v. Harris Cty., 529 U.S. 576, 596–97 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
344 Id. at 596.
345 Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 1003–04
(2005) (Breyer, J., concurring) (quoting United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 237 (2001)).
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lambast the Court’s reliance on agency procedure, noting that even in
a case involving notice-and-comment rulemaking, “Congress may
have intended not to leave the matter of a particular interpretation up
to the agency.”346 Justice Breyer’s Brand X concurrence is consistent
with his majority opinion in Barnhart v. Walton,347 where he examined
“the interstitial nature of the legal question, the related expertise of
the Agency, the importance of the question to administration of the
statute, the complexity of that administration, and the careful consideration the Agency has given the question over a long period of time”
to conclude that Chevron applied.348
Essentially, Justice Breyer’s blended approach to deference seeks
to ascertain congressional intent through an examination of the totality of the circumstances. Thus, he asks simply “whether Congress
would want a reviewing court to defer to the agency interpretation at
issue.”349 Particularly as compared to the more formalistic step-by-step
model of Mead and Chevron advocated by some courts and scholars,
Justice Breyer’s approach is more functionalistic. One of us has described this approach as generating a “word cloud,” with one or more
doctrinal factors and tools of statutory interpretation popping out in
ad hoc fashion to point toward or away from a congressional desire
for deference.350
Justice Breyer’s concurrence in City of Arlington best illustrates
the blended approach. Justice Breyer refused to reduce congressional
intent to just “a deference-warranting gap” in the statute, and instead
called upon the Court to also consider additional factors.351 In addition to the factors he considered in Barnhart, Justice Breyer added
that the “distance from the agency’s ordinary statutory duties” and the
subject matter, as well as traditional tools of statutory interpretation,
can be used to ascertain whether “ambiguity comes accompanied with
agency authority to fill a gap with an interpretation that carries the
force of law.”352 If Congress has not spoken unambiguously, the court
should ask “whether Congress would have intended the agency to re-

346

Id. at 1004.

347

535 U.S. 212 (2002).

348

Id. at 222.

349

Hickman, supra note 130, at 541.

350

Id. at 541–42.

351 City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1875 (2013) (Breyer, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
352

Id. at 1875–76.
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solve the resulting ambiguity” and award or deny deference
accordingly.353
Some circuit court judges have used Justice Breyer’s blended
Chevron—especially his analysis in Barnhart—in deciding which
agency materials outside of notice-and-comment rules and adjudications warrant Chevron deference. In Atrium Medical Center v. United
States Department of Health & Human Services,354 the Sixth Circuit
considered whether the interpretation by the Center for Medicare and
Medicaid Services (“CMS”) of the Medicare Act,355 articulated in the
Provider Reimbursement Manual (“PRM”), warranted Chevron or
Skidmore deference.356 Prior to Atrium Medical Center, a number of
circuits reviewed the PRM under Skidmore,357 citing Mead for the proposition that agency manuals are “beyond the Chevron pale.”358 In
holding that the PRM deserved consideration under Chevron, the
Sixth Circuit found that the portion of the PRM at issue differed from
other parts in that CMS solicited comments, plus CMS has substantial
expertise and developed the PRM over a “long, long time.”359 The
Sixth Circuit then concluded that “[b]ecause Barnhart directs us to
apply Chevron, our analysis of the Secretary’s statutory interpretation
is relatively simple: CMS’s treatment of non-insurance short-term disability programs is simply not ‘manifestly contrary’ to [the statute].”360
The Sixth Circuit’s analysis lacks the structure of a formalistic approach to Chevron, and instead blends Mead’s threshold question with
the substantive analysis of Chevron into a single totality-of-the-circumstances question.
H. Chief Justice Roberts and a More Limited Chevron?
A growing body of opinions from Chief Justice Roberts seems to
reject wholesale application of Chevron to every ambiguous statutory
provision, suggesting that a “grant of authority over some portion of a
statute does not necessarily mean that Congress granted the agency
Id. at 1876.
766 F.3d 560 (6th Cir. 2014).
355 Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286 (establishing
Medicare).
356 Atrium Med. Ctr., 766 F.3d at 566–67.
357 See, e.g., Visiting Nurse Ass’n Gregoria Auffant, Inc. v. Thompson, 447 F.3d 68, 73 (1st
Cir. 2006); Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 332 F.3d 654, 660 (D.C.
Cir. 2003); Cmty. Hosp. of the Monterey Peninsula v. Thompson, 323 F.3d 782, 791 (9th Cir.
2003).
358 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 234 (2001).
359 Atrium Med. Ctr., 766 F.3d at 571–74.
360 Id. at 573.
353
354
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interpretive authority over all its provisions.”361 Dissenting in City of
Arlington, Chief Justice Roberts argued that courts should ask
“whether Congress had ‘delegat[ed] authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute’” before applying Chevron.362
He contended that the Constitution requires a limited Chevron to preserve the separation of powers and ensure that Congress truly wished
to delegate interpretive authority to the agency to decide the issue.363
Of course, Chief Justice Roberts wrote for a minority of the Court in
City of Arlington. But he tried again, and accomplished much the
same result, writing for the Court in King v. Burwell.364 In that case,
Chief Justice Roberts revived a fledgling major questions doctrine to
require courts to predicate the availability of Chevron review on the
centrality of the issue to the statutory scheme, its economic and political significance, and the extent of the agency’s expertise.365
Christopher Walker has both identified and defended this trend
based upon his survey of agency officials regarding the technical drafting assistance they provide to Congress.366 Agency officials overwhelmingly expressed the view that congressional staffers do not
understand preexisting regulatory regimes and draft poor-quality statutes.367 In light of these findings, Walker argues that Chevron deference encourages agencies to engage in self-delegation by drafting
legislation deliberately, with an eye toward Chevron, to give themselves room to maneuver where they know greater statutory specificity might preclude their preferred policy outcomes.368 Walker argues
that Congress cannot effectively police agency self-delegation through
361 City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1883 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); see
also Hickman, supra note 33.
362 City of Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1881 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (alteration in original)
(quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984)).
363 Id. at 1886.
364 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015); see supra notes 32–33 and accompanying text (describing King v.
Burwell); see also Hickman, supra note 33, at 62–64 (linking Chief Justice Roberts’s approach to
King v. Burwell with his earlier dissenting opinion in City of Arlington).
365 King, 135 S. Ct. at 2488–89; see also Hickman, supra note 33, at 63–64 (describing the
test for Chevron’s applicability one can draw from King v. Burwell, and connecting that test with
the Court’s earlier decision in FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.).
366 Christopher J. Walker, Legislating in the Shadows, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1377 (2017).
367 Id. at 1406–07.
368 Id. at 1407. Critics of Auer deference have raised similar arguments that deference regimes encourage self-delegation when the agency is substantially involved in drafting the later
interpreted law. See Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1211–12 (2015) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment); id. at 1213–25 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment); John F.
Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of Agency
Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 654 (1996); Nicholas R. Bednar, Essay, Defying Auer Deference:
Skidmore as a Solution to Conservative Concerns in Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Association, U.
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the bicameral debate process due to institutional incompetency.
Referencing Chief Justice Roberts’s approach, Walker contends a
heightened “Chevron Step Zero”—asking “whether the collective
Congress intended to delegate [the] particular substantive question to
the agency”—would prevent collusion between individual members of
Congress and encourage clearer delegation.369
Chief Justice Roberts’s approach has resonated with some circuit
court judges. For example, in a concurring opinion in ClearCorrect
Operating, LLC v. International Trade Commission,370 Judge
O’Malley of the Federal Circuit cited King v. Burwell in finding that
“there are times when courts should not search for an ambiguity in the
statute because it is clear Congress could not have intended to grant
the agency authority to act in the substantive space at issue.”371 Judge
O’Malley argued that the court should not reach Chevron because the
agency’s interpretation would allow the International Trade Commission (“ITC”) to regulate the internet despite the ITC having no relevant expertise.372 In conclusion, Judge O’Malley summarized,
“[b]ecause Congress did not intend to delegate such authority to the
Commission, . . . we never get past what some refer to as Chevron step
zero.”373
One can cast Chief Justice Roberts’s approach to Chevron as either an expansion of or an addition to the Supreme Court’s 2001 decision in Mead, which limited the scope of Chevron’s applicability to
agency actions carrying the force of law and reinstated the multifactor
Skidmore standard as an alternative for those that do not.374 Alternatively, one can read Chief Justice Roberts’s analysis as yet another
reframing of Chevron step one, reminiscent of some of Justice
Breyer’s rhetoric. Either way, the result is less deference to agency
interpretations of statutes.

MINN. L. REV.: DE NOVO (June 24, 2015), http://www.minnesotalawreview.org/2015/06/defyingauer-deference-skidmore-solution-conservative-concerns-perez-v-mortgage-bankers-association.
369

Walker, supra note 366, at 1421–22.

370

810 F.3d 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2015).

371

Id. at 1302 (O’Malley, J., concurring).

372

Id. at 1303.

373

Id.

United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 221 (2001); see Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323
U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (describing factors relevant for deference); supra notes 121–30 and accompanying text (describing the Mead decision).

R

374

R
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DEFENDING CHEVRON

When contemplating the many claims of Chevron’s impending
demise, one has to consider exactly which aspect or variation of Chevron the anti-Chevron crowd has in mind. Many critics of Chevron do
not reject deference per se but rather advocate for certain variations
thereof.
Justice Scalia was the strongest advocate of a formalistic two-step
Chevron,375 although he later seemed sympathetic to the notion of
Chevron having only one step.376 Yet, Justice Scalia derided Mead and
the more flexible, blended approach to Chevron pursued by Justice
Breyer.377 Justice Scalia questioned Chevron’s validity only after the
Court repeatedly strayed too far from his original vision.378 Similarly,
Justice Breyer purportedly dislikes Chevron and has steadfastly refused to accept Justice Scalia’s formalistic Chevron in favor of his
more flexible, blended approach.379 Yet, Justice Breyer tends to be at
least as deferential, if not more so, to agency legal interpretations than
Justice Scalia was.380
Regardless of their many disagreements regarding Chevron’s validity, operation, and scope, however, both Justices have repeatedly
acknowledged the importance of judicial deference and its role in administrative law. Like Justices Scalia and Breyer, academic critics of
Chevron frequently seem merely to want to replace one version of
Chevron with another, or with Skidmore—not do away altogether
with judicial deference to agency action. As Part II establishes, for
375 See Scalia, supra note 56 (demonstrating Justice Scalia’s advocacy of a two-step
Chevron).

R

376 United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 566 U.S. 478, 493 n.1 (2012) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
377 See Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 226–27 (2002) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) (objecting to Justice Breyer’s reliance on contextual factors in conjunction with Chevron analysis); cf. Mead, 533 U.S. at 241 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing
Skidmore’s multifactor approach derisively as “th’ol’ ‘totality of the circumstances’ test”); Christensen v. Harris Cty., 529 U.S. 576, 589 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment) (describing Skidmore’s factors as “anachronis[tic]”).
378 See Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1212 (2015) (Scalia, J., concurring in
the judgment).
379 See Breyer, supra note 66, 373–82; see also City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863,
1875–76 (2013) (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (disregarding
Justice Scalia’s Chevron analysis in favor of his own).

R

380 Eskridge & Baer, supra note 119, at 1153–54 (documenting deference rates among individual Justices, including that Justice Breyer deferred more often than Justice Scalia, although
Justice Scalia was more likely than Justice Breyer to defer to ideologically conservative
interpretations).

R
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better or worse, the Chevron umbrella has proved large enough to
accommodate just about any vision of deferential review.
By contrast, other Chevron critics seem to want to do away with
deferential review of agency statutory interpretations altogether. Certainly, the sponsors of SOPRA fall into this category, with their calls
for de novo review. Their efforts focus on the wrong target.
For all of the debate and disagreement over Chevron’s substance,
scope, and trajectory, two things seem clear, and both concern delegation.381 First, Chevron is a byproduct of congressional delegation (or
conferral of discretionary authority). Indeed, the one aspect of Chevron upon which most of the Justices agree is the presence or absence
of a congressional delegation of decisionmaking power as the touchstone for deciding whether to defer to agency interpretations of statutes. Only Justice Scalia has objected (rather vociferously) to Mead’s
emphasis on “delegation” as relevant to deference.382 Nevertheless, in
describing his understanding of Chevron, Justice Scalia acknowledged
that some statutory ambiguities reflect congressional intent to “leave
[their] resolution to the agency,” and such ambiguities represent “the
conferral of discretion upon the agency”383—i.e., delegation in all but
name.384 Without Congress’s expansive reliance on agencies to make
significant policy decisions, Chevron would be unnecessary.
Second, Congress shows little inclination to curtail its habit of giving agencies expansive statutory authority to exercise policymaking
discretion, and the courts appear equally disinclined to declare such
power grants unconstitutional. So long as agencies are allowed such
authority, Chevron deference—or something much like it—is likely
inevitable. The courts and Congress should not fool themselves into
believing otherwise.
381

See supra Parts I, II.

See Mead, 533 U.S. at 239, 241–45 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Nat’l Cable &
Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 1005, 1014–20 (2005) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
382

383

Scalia, supra note 56, at 516.

Justice Scalia’s resistance to characterizing the conferral of policymaking discretion as
delegation is consistent with his pronouncements regarding executive power and the nondelegation doctrine. See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472–73 (2001); Mistretta
v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 417 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The whole theory of lawful
congressional ‘delegation’ is not that Congress is sometimes too busy or too divided and can
therefore assign its responsibility of making law to someone else; but rather that a certain degree
of discretion, and thus of lawmaking, inheres in most executive or judicial action, and it is up to
Congress, by the relative specificity or generality of its statutory commands, to determine—up to
a point—how small or how large that degree shall be.”).
384

R
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A. Chevron Is Just a Standard of Review
With all of the debates and complaints about Chevron deference,
it is easy to lose sight of the fact that Chevron is, primarily, just a
standard of review rather than a rule of decision. Chevron serves important doctrinal functions in facilitating the organization of legal arguments and helping judges to think about their role vis-à-vis
agencies. In such ways, Chevron may influence judicial decisionmaking. At the end of the day, however, standards of review generally do
not determine case outcomes. In the vast majority of cases, judicial
evaluation of statutory text, history, and purpose—not Chevron—determines whether courts uphold an agency’s interpretation of a statute.385 Indeed, much of Chevron’s variability can be attributed to the
fact that Chevron is a standard of review.
Standards of review always speak in terms of how skeptical or
deferential a reviewing court should be in assessing the “correctness
or propriety” of a lower-level adjudicator or interpreter, whether jury,
court, or agency.386 Yet, standards of review are not bright-line rules,
nor do they even represent fixed points on an attitudinal continuum.
Rather, they are malleable. Justice Frankfurter described standards of
review as reflecting moods: “[T]hat mood must be respected, even
though it can only serve as a standard for judgment and not as a body
of rigid rules assuring sameness of application.”387 How does one
pinpoint with precision what a mood represents?
Standards of review can be distilled into two key elements: the
boilerplate and the application. The boilerplate recites talismanic language—describing the mood—across courts and cases to maintain the
appearance of uniformity.388 For any standard of review, however, the
boilerplate only scratches the surface of actual, case-by-case application. Particular to the administrative law context, even before Chevron took hold, Professor Kenneth Culp Davis observed:
Probably more than 500 pages a year are devoted to detailed
statements about scope of review of administrative action;
most of that verbiage is harmless, for neither the judges nor
the readers of opinions take it seriously. Whether the verbi385 See Liu, supra note 225, at 291 (arguing that Chevron really only matters in “hard cases
. . . when the court has already done all it can to ‘say what the law is’ ” (quoting Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803))).
386 Kelly Kunsch, Standard of Review (State and Federal): A Primer, 18 SEATTLE U. L. REV.
11, 15 (1994).
387 Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 487 (1951).
388 See Kunsch, supra note 386, at 15; Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L.
REV. 379, 381–82 (1985) (describing this as “trigger[s]” and “response[s]”).

R
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age about scope of review is helpful is doubtful, for it is typically vague, abstract, uncertain, and conflicting.389
The relative uniformity of a standard’s boilerplate tricks commentators into searching for uniformity in the standard’s application.
These observations about a standard of review’s boilerplate hold
especially true for the Chevron standard. With its two-step framework,
Chevron’s boilerplate often seems more rule-like than most standards
of review—certainly more so than the alternative, multifactor Skidmore standard.390 But that more rule-like framework is deceptive—
not least because, as described in Part II, Chevron’s two-step boilerplate routinely takes different rhetorical forms that, in turn, support
different analytical approaches that may be more or less formalistic,
more or less textualist, and more or less deferential.
With regard to application, scholars have long criticized judges
for applying standards of review inconsistently.391 Martha Davis and
Steven Childress observed that “standards of review become confused
because reviewing judges, like the rest of us, respond differently to
new situations.”392 Certainly, Chevron’s history mirrors this critique.
The Supreme Court unknowingly sprung upon the lower courts what
appeared to be a new two-part standard without articulating with any
degree of detail its scope or substance.393 As litigants invoked Chevron
in new contexts, courts had to make decisions about whether and how
Chevron applied to the cases before them.394 Multiple versions of
Chevron emerged because even the Justices disagree about the standard’s nuances. Consequently, the Supreme Court’s pronouncements
have been vague and inconsistent, and lower court judges with
crowded dockets have been left to do the best they can with the cases
before them. Multiply that lack of clarity across thousands of circuit
court cases featuring different agencies, statutes, and subject matters,
and Chevron’s variability is both understandable and predictable.
5 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 29:2 (2d ed. 1984).
See Thomas W. Merrill, The Mead Doctrine: Rules and Standards, Meta-Rules and MetaStandards, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 807, 809–10 (2002) (making this comparison).
391 See, e.g., Martha S. Davis & Steven Alan Childress, Standards of Review in Criminal
Appeals: Fifth Circuit Illustration and Analysis, 60 TUL. L. REV. 461 (1986); Henry J. Friendly,
Indiscretion About Discretion, 31 EMORY L.J. 747, 762–65 (1982) (noting a large range in the
interpretation of “abuse of discretion” by appellate judges); Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E.
Levy, Judicial Incentives and Indeterminacy in Substantive Review of Administrative Decisions,
44 DUKE L.J. 1051, 1053–62 (1995) (presenting a model for determining doctrinal
indeterminacy).
392 Davis & Childress, supra note 391, at 561.
393 See supra Section I.A.
394 See supra Section I.B.
389
390
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Furthermore, because Chevron arguably calls for separate inquiries into statutory clarity and agency reasonableness, Chevron developed not along a single deference continuum but on a
multidimensional grid comprised of X (how clear), Y (how reasonable), and Z (how formalistic). Justice Scalia pursued a formalistic
Chevron with a strong step one and a deferential but robust step two.
Mark Seidenfeld’s syncopated Chevron assumes a still formalistic, but
more deferential, standard with a narrow, textual step one inquiry and
a broader but still highly deferential step two. The incorporation of
State Farm’s hard look analysis by Ron Levin and some courts is also
formalistic but, in addition to featuring a robust step one analysis, expands Chevron step two beyond a mere statutory inquiry. Justice
Breyer’s approach and that of Matthew Stephenson and Adrian
Vermeule blend Chevron’s two steps, and so are less formalistic, albeit
in different ways that may or may not be more deferential than the
others. And all of these variants of Chevron find support in the Chevron opinion and subsequent jurisprudence.
In summary, the use of a uniform label for a standard of review—
or, indeed, any legal doctrine—does not create a uniformly applied
legal doctrine.395 Allan Erbsen has observed a similar state of affairs
with the choice-of-law doctrine announced by Erie Railroad Co. v.
Tompkins.396 Courts and scholars have debated the contours of the
Erie doctrine for over three-quarters of a century, and are just now
accepting the viability of coexisting variations, leading Erbsen to suggest that there is no one, single Erie doctrine.397 Chevron’s status as a
standard of review supports accepting its operation as similarly malleable. Perhaps it is time that courts and commentators recognize that
Chevron can have multiple variations, all of which are reasonable interpretations of the doctrine’s primary source.
B. Statutory Ambiguity Is Unavoidable
No matter what standard of review, or even which version of
Chevron, the courts choose to employ in evaluating agency interpretations of statutes, courts will disagree over statutory meaning. Even
when judges employ pure de novo review using traditional tools of
395

See supra Part II (comparing a number of variations of Chevron).

396

304 U.S. 64 (1938).

See Erbsen, supra note 208, at 581–82 (“Erie’s imprecision and importance have combined to transform the opinion into a mirror that reflects the varying interests of its readers.”).
397
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statutory construction with no layer of deference intruding, they often
disagree over what statutes mean.398
Moreover, even if one pursues a robust, de novo–like analysis of
statutory text, history, and purpose, some statutory questions simply
do not have answers that can be derived through traditional common
law reasoning. As Justice Scalia once observed:
An ambiguity in a statute committed to agency implementation can be attributed to either of two congressional desires:
(1) Congress intended a particular result, but was not clear
about it; or (2) Congress had no particular intent on the subject, but meant to leave its resolution to the agency. . . .
When the latter is the case, what we have is the conferral of
discretion upon the agency, and the only question of law
presented to the courts is whether the agency has acted
within the scope of its discretion—i.e., whether its resolution
of the ambiguity is reasonable.399
Hence, Chevron itself recognizes that many statutes are silent on particular issues, and that the resolution of these silences “really centers
on the wisdom of the agency’s policy, rather than whether it is a reasonable choice within a gap left open by Congress.”400
Some examples are obvious. Many statutes contain specific statutory delegations of authority to make rules or adjudicate cases to accomplish a particular, congressionally identified goal, and resolving
such matters obviously is not a matter of interpretation but of pure,
naked policymaking.401 Long before it decided Chevron, the Supreme
Court recognized the limitations of its role in reviewing agency exercises of specific authority grants. AT&T Co. v. United States,402 decided in 1936, offers a key illustration. In that case, the Court
considered regulations implementing a provision of the Communications Act of 1934403 giving the FCC specific authority to establish uniform standards of accounting for utilities required to report their
398 See, e.g., Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 127–28, 139–40 (1998) (featuring a
court divided over statutory meaning under de novo review); Smith v. United States, 508 U.S.
223, 233–42 (1993) (same); Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 108–14, 119–21 (1990) (same).
399

Scalia, supra note 56, at 516.

400

See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 866 (1984).

401 See Pauley v. Bethenergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 696–97 (1991); see also Richard J.
Pierce, Jr., Chevron and Its Aftermath: Judicial Review of Agency Interpretations of Statutory
Provisions, 41 VAND. L. REV. 301, 304–08 (1988) (discussing the distinction between statutory
interpretation as a question of law and a question of policy).
402

299 U.S. 232 (1936).

403

Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064.

R

\\jciprod01\productn\G\GWN\85-5\GWN502.txt

1448

unknown

Seq: 57

THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

14-NOV-17

9:57

[Vol. 85:1392

receipts and expenditures to the agency for ratemaking purposes.404
Beyond the contextual need to support the ratemaking function itself,
nothing in the statute’s text, history, or purpose offered more detailed
guidance regarding the content of those uniform standards of accounting.405 Hence, no mere application of traditional tools of statutory construction could aid the Court in evaluating the FCC’s regulations.
Beyond “gauging rationality,”406 what else was the Court to do? In the
end, the only option for the Court was to evaluate the FCC’s regulations for reasonableness—whether they were “‘so entirely at odds
with fundamental principles of correct accounting’ as to be the expression of a whim rather than an exercise of judgment.”407 In deferring to
the agency, the Court said that it was “not at liberty to substitute its
own discretion for that of administrative officers who have kept within
the bounds of their administrative powers.”408
When drafting a regulatory statute, Congress often cannot (or
does not want to) articulate clear legislative rules for things like “what
constitute[s] a ‘safe’ drug, a ‘reasonable hazard,’ . . . [or] a ‘crashworthy automobile.’”409 Congress assigns responsibility for giving content to these terms to agency experts, whether through rulemaking,
through adjudication, or both.410 Broad statutory terms may cabin
agency discretion, and a court might be able to invoke traditional interpretive tools to arrive at a workable understanding of such words
and phrases. In AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Board, for example, the
Supreme Court concluded that the word “necessary” as used in the
Telecommunications Act of 1996411 with respect to network elements
conferred broad discretion on the FCC, but also served a limiting
function, and that the FCC’s interpretation of the statute exceeded the
limitations imposed by even that broad term.412 But resolving terms as
AT&T Co., 299 U.S. at 235.
See id. at 235–36.
406 Id. at 237.
407 Id. at 236–37 (citation omitted) (quoting Kan. City S. Ry. Co. v. United States, 231 U.S.
423, 444 (1913)).
408 Id. at 236.
409 JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND WHY
THEY DO IT 246 (1989).
410 See id. at 246–47; see also SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery II), 332 U.S. 194, 202–03
(1947) (concluding that, where Congress gives an agency the power to exercise delegated power
through both rulemaking and adjudication, the choice between those two formats lies with the
agency).
411 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified at 47
U.S.C. § 251(d)(2) (2012)).
412 See, e.g., AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 388–90 (1999) (recognizing statutory terms “necessary” and “impair” as giving the agency broad but not unlimited discretion).
404
405
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vague as “necessary”—or “safe,” “reasonable,” or “crashworthy”—inherently involves making policy judgments as to what activities are
desired or acceptable, promoted or prohibited.413
Additionally, as the Chevron Court recognized, particularly given
the complexity of modern statutes, sometimes congressional reliance
on agency policymaking is not so explicit, meaning that Congress did
not see the problem to be resolved but nevertheless clearly signaled
somehow in the statute its intent that agencies have discretion in filling the gap.414 To such ends, Congress routinely by statute authorizes
agencies to adopt rules and regulations as needed to effectuate statutory goals.415 And the Supreme Court has long recognized instances in
which Congress has delegated general rulemaking authority and, in
turn, statutory interpretation of ambiguous provisions involves policymaking.416 Such was the case in Chevron itself, where the EPA exercised general rulemaking authority to elaborate how an underdefined
statutory term applied to a common set of facts and circumstances,
and the Court did not feel that traditional tools of statutory construction offered a clear answer.
Even if Chevron is not part of the analysis, reasonable judges will
prefer different tools of statutory construction and reach different
conclusions regarding statutory meaning, whether or not they are influenced at least partly by policy implications.417 In Yates v. United
States,418 for example, the Supreme Court considered whether a commercial fisherman who tossed harvested undersized fish into the sea
could be charged under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act419 for knowingly conSee WILSON, supra note 409, at 241.
See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984); see
also Scalia, supra note 56, at 516–18.
415 See Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn Tongue Watts, Agency Rules with the Force of Law:
The Original Convention, 116 HARV. L. REV. 467, 483–87 (2002) (noting general rulemaking
grants in various statutes). For examples of grants of general authority, see, for example, 15
U.S.C. § 77s(a) (2012), granting authority to the Securities and Exchange Commission over the
Securities Act of 1933; 26 U.S.C. § 7805(a) (2012), granting authority to the Secretary of the
Treasury Department over the Internal Revenue Code; and 29 U.S.C. § 156 (2012), granting
authority to the National Labor Relations Board over the National Labor Relations Act.
416 See, e.g., United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 383 (1961) (“If this choice represents a
reasonable accommodation of conflicting polices that were committed to the agency’s care by
the statute, we should not disturb it unless it appears from the statute or its legislative history
that the accommodation is not one that Congress would have sanctioned.”).
417 See Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2118, 2120
(2016) (reviewing ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES (2014)).
418 135 S. Ct. 1074 (2015).
419 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 15 and 18 U.S.C.).
413

R

414
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cealing a “tangible object with the intent to impede, obstruct, or influence the investigation” of a United States agency.420 Writing for the
plurality, Justice Ginsburg, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Breyer and Sotomayor,421 utilized the statutory text, textual canons, dictionaries, other provisions within the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,
other statutes, legislative history, and the rule of lenity to conclude
that “tangible object” applied only to objects intended to “record or
preserve information.”422 Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion,
which Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas joined, using nearly all of
the same tools to reach the opposite conclusion.423
Chevron’s threshold inquiry—whether the statute at issue is ambiguous—merely adds another layer of complexity while reflecting the
same disagreements regarding statutory meaning. In other words, just
as judges will inevitably disagree sometimes in attempting to discern
statutory meaning using traditional tools, they will likewise inevitably
disagree in applying those same tools to assess whether a statute is
clear or ambiguous. As Justice Scalia observed early in Chevron’s life,
how one answers “how clear is clear [] may have much to do with
where one stands on the earlier points of what Chevron means and
whether Chevron is desirable.”424 He then ruminated regarding differences in interpretive methodology:
One who finds more often (as I do) that the meaning of a
statute is apparent from its text and from its relationship
with other laws, thereby finds less often that the triggering
requirement for Chevron deference exists. It is thus relatively rare that Chevron will require me to accept an interpretation which, though reasonable, I would not personally
adopt. Contrariwise, one who abhors a “plain meaning” rule,
and is willing to permit the apparent meaning of a statute to
be impeached by the legislative history, will more frequently
find agency-liberating ambiguity, and will discern a much
broader range of “reasonable” interpretation that the agency
may adopt and to which the courts must pay deference.425

420

Yates, 135 S. Ct. at 1078 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1519 (2012)).

Justice Alito concurred in the judgment, but did not join the majority opinion. See id. at
1089–90 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
421

422

Id. at 1074–89 (plurality opinion).

423

Id. at 1090–101 (Kagan, J., dissenting).

424

Scalia, supra note 56, at 521.

425

Id.
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In short, that question—how clear is clear—focuses only partly on
Chevron itself. The interpretive methodology of the judge applying it
as the standard of review necessarily comes into play as well.
A recent exchange of ideas between Chief Judge Robert
Katzmann of the Second Circuit and Judge Brett Kavanaugh of the
D.C. Circuit highlights the difficulty of reaching consensus in statutory
interpretation cases, with or without the Chevron standard. Writing
generally about statutory interpretation, Chief Judge Katzmann advocated using legislative history to understand what the law means and
ensure faithful execution of congressional intent.426 Although he
warned against using legislative history to inject ambiguity into otherwise clear statutes,427 he maintained that failing to consider legislative
history could actually expand a judge’s discretion by leaving her “only
with words that could be interpreted in a variety of ways without contextual guidance as to what legislators may have thought.”428 By comparison, Judge Kavanaugh expressed concern that judicial reliance on
legislative history to resolve interpretive questions would merely allow judges to find whatever evidence supports their favored interpretation.429 He instead advocated a two-step process for resolving
statutory meaning: courts should first use textualist tools to find the
“best reading” of the statute; courts then could apply substantive canons to depart from the text.430 In response to Judge Kavanaugh,
Chief Judge Katzmann raised the possibility that there will always “be
legitimate differences about what is the ‘best reading’ under the proposed framework whenever there is ambiguity” in statutory
meaning.431
Perhaps not surprisingly, the exchange between Chief Judge
Katzmann and Judge Kavanaugh reflected disagreement over Chevron’s approach to statutory ambiguity as well. Consistent with Chevron’s general premise, Chief Judge Katzmann described statutory
ambiguity as “often the product of the simple fact that the issues are
difficult and Congress, having identified the general problem, leaves it
to an agency or court to determine how best to address the problem in
its specifics.”432 By comparison, Judge Kavanaugh was more prepared
See ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES 38–39 (2014).
See Robert A. Katzmann, Response to Judge Kavanaugh’s Review of Judging Statutes,
129 HARV. L. REV. F. 388, 392–93 (2016).
428 KATZMANN, supra note 426, at 48.
429 See Kavanaugh, supra note 417, at 2149–50.
430 Id. at 2144.
431 See Katzmann, supra note 427, at 398.
432 KATZMANN, supra note 426, at 47.
426
427

R
R
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to find statutory clarity. In cases where an agency interprets “broad
and open-ended terms,” such as “reasonable” or “feasible,”
a judge can engage in appropriately rigorous scrutiny of an
agency’s statutory interpretation and simultaneously be very
deferential to an agency’s policy choices within the discretion
granted to it by the statute.
But in cases where an agency is instead interpreting a
specific statutory term or phrase, courts should determine
whether the agency’s interpretation is the best reading of the
statutory text.433
Nevertheless, Judge Kavanaugh also worried that “judges often cannot make that initial clarity versus ambiguity decision in a settled,
principled, or evenhanded way.”434 Judge Kavanaugh’s concern is not
redundancy, but fear that nontextualists will too quickly end the step
one inquiry. Indeed, he worried that Chevron encourages the executive branch to abuse the doctrine by aggressively pursuing ambiguity
in litigation.435 According to Judge Kavanaugh, “In certain major
Chevron cases, different judges will reach different results even
though they may actually agree on what is the best reading of the statutory text.”436 Consequently, Judge Kavanaugh concluded that step
one is so fraught with disagreement that “we need to consider eliminating that inquiry as the threshold trigger.”437 In this sense, Judge

433

Kavanaugh, supra note 417, at 2153–54 (footnote omitted).

434

Id. at 2118.

435 See id. at 2151. Judge Kavanaugh claims “some academics fail to fully grasp the reality
of how this works.” Id. Kavanaugh is undoubtedly correct at least anecdotally, but the extent to
which Chevron has such an effect systemically is difficult to discern with any reliable degree of
certainty. See generally Christopher J. Walker, Chevron Inside the Regulatory State: An Empirical Assessment, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 703 (2014) (offering the first empirical analysis of Chevron’s influence on agency rulemaking, with nuanced results). James Q. Wilson, after
acknowledging that agencies actively pursue autonomy, stated, “The supposedly imperialistic
character of government agencies is a vast oversimplification.” WILSON, supra note 409, at 195.
Although he was an academic, Wilson served in three Republican administrations (as well as the
Johnson administration) and was a leading expert on bureaucracy. See Tevi Troy, The Mind in
the Oval Office, AM. ENTERPRISE INST. (Mar. 2, 2012, 2:30 PM), http://www.aei.org/publication/
the-mind-in-the-oval-office/print/; see also James Q. Wilson, Ph.D. (In Memoriam), PEPP. SCH.
PUB. POL’Y, http://publicpolicy.pepperdine.edu/academics/faculty/?faculty=james_wilson [https://
perma.cc/MD4W-REN3] (last visited Sept. 2, 2017). Wilson published his seminal commentary
on bureaucracy in 1989, and it is fair to theorize that the post-Chevron years have altered agency
behavior. Regardless, as this Article describes, at least some understandings of Chevron analysis
leave room within that doctrine to police agency aggressiveness.
436

Kavanaugh, supra note 417, at 2153.

437

Id. at 2154.
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Kavanaugh’s approach to Chevron appears similar to Stephenson and
Vermeule’s one-step Chevron.438
In short, ambiguity is inevitable so long as jurists continue to disagree about what tools and interpretive theories ought to apply when
interpreting statutes. Those disagreements inevitably spill over and infuse the disagreements over Chevron and its two steps. But eliminating Chevron will not magically resolve the problem of statutory
ambiguity.
C. Delegation, Not Deference, Is the “Problem”
In the end, when courts apply Chevron, agencies will win some
cases and lose others. Whenever judges reject controversial agency
statutory interpretations, critics will contend the judges were inadequately deferential. Whenever judges uphold controversial agency
statutory interpretations, critics will contend the judges were overly
deferential. Sometimes, judges strain our credulity by employing
traditional tools of statutory construction in arguably tortured ways to
find statutory clarity. Some judges will find ambiguity in a stop sign.439
Blaming Chevron for case outcomes that one dislikes is misdirected.
The real “fault” (to the extent it exists) is a system of government that
routinely relies on unelected agency officials to resolve hard policy
questions.
Yet, Congress seems unlikely to stop delegating policymaking authority to agencies. In Mistretta v. United States,440 the Supreme Court
contended that, “in our increasingly complex society, replete with ever
changing and more technical problems, Congress simply cannot do its
job absent an ability to delegate power under broad general directives.”441 In the same case, even as he dissented from allowing the Sentencing Commission to adopt uniform sentencing guidelines, Justice
Scalia conceded that courts cannot readily preclude Congress from relying on agencies to make policy because “no statute can be entirely
precise” and “some judgments involving policy considerations[] must
be left to the officers executing the law and to the judges applying
it.”442
438

See supra Section II.E.

Credit for this particular observation goes to a judge who said it to one of the authors
and whose identity we will not disclose, though he attributed authorship to another as well.
439

440

488 U.S. 361 (1989).

441

Id. at 372.

442

Id. at 415 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Regardless of whether Congress could stop delegating policymaking discretion, it seems unlikely to do so. Arguments abound justifying
congressional delegations of discretionary power to agencies. Congress routinely delegates authority to agencies because it wants to utilize their policy and scientific expertise to resolve programmatic details
and fill statutory gaps.443 Additionally, Christopher Walker’s study of
agency involvement in statutory drafting reflects interaction between
agency officials and congressional staffers that may, in turn, lead Congress to delegate even more discretionary authority to the former.
Notwithstanding their own subject matter expertise, congressional
staffers routinely seek assistance—much of it technical, but some of it
substantive—from agencies when drafting legislation.444 Congressional staffers may be insufficiently familiar with agencies’ governing
statutes and implementing regulations, leading congressional staffers
to seek drafting assistance from agency experts to avoid duplicative or
conflicting language in legislative proposals.445 In other words, Congress utilizes agency expertise in the legislative drafting process to improve statutory quality and avoid creating enforcement headaches for
the agency once the legislation passes. And because agencies play a
substantial role in the legislative process, they may be perceived as
possessing comparative expertise over courts in understanding Congress’s original intent, which in turn may prompt Congress to delegate
more power to agency officials.446
Broad delegations may at times indicate that Congress cannot decide what it wants or does not know what a particular regulatory
scheme needs to function most effectively.447 Particularly in the face of
changing social, economic, or technological conditions, good governance in some instances may dictate that Congress should delegate general rulemaking power coupled with open-ended statutory language to
give agencies flexibility in utilizing their expertise to accomplish congressional goals. If Congress, despite its investigative powers, cannot
ascertain the best means of achieving complex regulatory goals, courts
443 See, e.g., McNollgast, The Political Origins of the Administrative Procedure Act, 15 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 180, 184 (1999) (suggesting more positively that delegation allows Congress “to
write simpler statutes, allows the details of policy to adjust to new knowledge and changed circumstances, and creates an expert body that can provide useful information about the needs for
changes in either legislation or appropriations”).
444 See Walker, supra note 366, at 1388–89.
445 See id. at 1391–94.
446 See id. at 1402–03; see also Peter L. Strauss, When the Judge Is Not the Primary Official
with Responsibility to Read: Agency Interpretation and the Problem of Legislative History, 66
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 321, 347–49 (1990).
447 WILSON, supra note 409, at 246–47.
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are unlikely to produce satisfactory solutions to such quandaries when
they arise in cases of narrow scope.
More cynically, Congress may at least sometimes draft regulatory
statutes ambiguously to serve the interests of the legislators themselves. Scholars have theorized, for example, that Congress uses ambiguous language to reduce legislative delays caused by continued
debate over statutory terms and shift the political costs of undesirable
decisions from legislators, whose jobs depend on public opinion, to
bureaucrats.448 If the details of regulatory schemes are controversial,
these scholars suggest, Congress may seek to claim credit for the politically favorable aspects of legislation on one hand, but shift blame for
politically undesirable decisions on the other.449
Regardless of Congress’s reasons for delegating policymaking discretion in the first instance, most jurists prefer not to be in the policymaking business, at least not on the same scale as agencies. As
Justice Blackmun put it, “A judge is first and foremost one who resolves disputes, and not one charged with the duty to fashion broad
policies establishing the rights and duties of citizens. That task is reserved primarily for legislators.”450 Of course, in any common law system, judicial resolution of individual cases often carries policy
implications. Nevertheless, the traditional sort of judicial policymaking is different at least in degree, if not in kind, from the major policymaking role that agencies play in the modern regulatory state.
Particularly as compared to agencies, generalist judges lack the
expertise to engage in that latter kind of policymaking. Indeed, the
Supreme Court in Chevron justified deferring to agency interpretations by recognizing that agencies are better policymakers than
courts.451 And, as Justice Scalia further recognized in Mistretta, Congress better understands the “necessities” of government and the
Court “almost never fe[els] qualified to second-guess Congress regarding the permissible degree of policy judgment that can be left to
those executing or applying the law.”452 Even if courts possessed more
institutional capacity to engage in expansive policymaking, most
judges likely do not want that sort of responsibility—hence most
448 See Morris P. Fiorina, Legislative Choice of Regulatory Forms: Legal Process or Administrative Process?, 39 PUB. CHOICE 33, 45–47 (1982); Mathew D. McCubbins & Talbot Page, A
Theory of Congressional Delegation, in CONGRESS: STRUCTURE AND POLICY 409 (Mathew D.
McCubbins & Terry Sullivan eds., 1987).
449 See DAVID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION 52–54 (1974).
450 Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 487 n.1 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
451 See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 864 (1984).
452 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 416 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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judges’ insistence that their function is to interpret rather than make
the law.
In sum, Congress has relied and likely will continue to rely on
agencies to exercise policymaking discretion in filling statutory gaps.
As Chevron counsels, when Congress clearly envisions an agency role
in resolving such questions, the only role that remains for the courts is
to police such agency interpretations for reasonableness. Hence, the
Court has grounded Chevron in the assumption that, where Congress
statutorily grants agencies the power to act with the force of law, Congress thus wants courts to defer to agency interpretations of those statutes.453 Some have described this assumption as fictional, contending
that Congress gives little consideration to judicial deference doctrine
or standards of review when it drafts legislation. A study by Abbe
Gluck and Lisa Bressman suggests otherwise, demonstrating at least
that, nearly thirty years after the Court’s Chevron decision, the practices and intentions of congressional staffers charged with drafting legislation strongly support the intuitions driving Chevron—that
Congress often but does not always intend to delegate primary interpretive responsibility to administering agencies rather than courts.454
Exemplifying the latter, Kent Barnett has documented Congress’s deliberate and express rejection of Chevron in the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.455
D. Amending the APA Will Not Eliminate Chevron
Could Congress amend the APA to contradict the Supreme
Court’s assumption that Congress generally wants it to defer as Chevron contemplates? Perhaps. SOPRA—the Separation of Powers Restoration Act—passed by the House of Representatives, is an example
of legislators attempting to do just that.456 Whether SOPRA would
effectively accomplish its goal of eliminating Chevron deference is
uncertain.
453

See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43.

See Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—
An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L.
REV. 901, 994 (2013).
454

455 See Kent Barnett, Improving Agencies’ Preemption Expertise with Chevmore Codification, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 587, 600 n.114 (2014) (citing 12 U.S.C. § 25b(b)(5)(A) (2012) as
directing courts to review decisions to preempt state law made by the Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency using the Skidmore standard).
456 Separation of Powers Restoration Act of 2016, H.R. 4768, 114th Cong. (2016); see supra
notes 26–29, 201–07 and accompanying text (discussing SOPRA).
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Section 706 of the APA presently calls upon reviewing courts to
“decide all relevant questions of law [and] interpret constitutional and
statutory provisions.”457 That same provision goes on to instruct reviewing courts to “set aside agency action” they find to be “arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
law.”458 Although the Court’s opinion in Chevron used language echoing APA section 706(2)(A)’s arbitrary and capricious standard,459 and
more recent opinions have linked Chevron step two to State Farm’s
interpretation of the same text,460 Justice Scalia is correct in saying
that the Court has never tied the Chevron standard of review very
tightly to the APA’s text.461
SOPRA proposes to amend APA section 706 to require courts to
“decide de novo all relevant questions of law, including the interpretation of constitutional and statutory provisions, and rules.”462 Although
SOPRA’s text does not mention Chevron explicitly, statements by the
Act’s sponsors and supporters indicate that their primary goal with
SOPRA is to eliminate the deferential Chevron standard of review for
agency interpretations of statutes.463
Given the general understanding that SOPRA’s proponents aim
to overturn Chevron,464 presumably many or even most judges would
honor that intent and stop applying Chevron, at least by name. At a
minimum, SOPRA’s reference to de novo review may encourage
more robust consideration of statutory text, history, and purpose from
judges otherwise inclined toward the least intrusive, and thus most
deferential, variants of Chevron analysis.
On the other hand, SOPRA’s text is not explicit in repudiating
Chevron altogether, leaving the amendment open to interpretation.
As should be apparent from Part II, at least in theory, the Chevron
standard itself contemplates a de novo–like step one analysis employing traditional tools of statutory construction to evaluate congres5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012).
Id. § 706(2)(A).
459 See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).
460 See supra notes 152–70 and accompanying text.
461 Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1211–12 (2015) (Scalia, J., concurring in
the judgment); see also supra notes 191–93 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Scalia’s
observations).
462 H.R. 4768 § 2(3) (emphasis added).
463 See, e.g., Press Release, Representative Bob Goodlatte, Goodlatte Introduces Major
Regulatory Reform Package to Promote Economic Growth & Job Creation (Jan. 3, 2017), https:/
/goodlatte.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=739; see also supra notes 26,
204–05 and accompanying text (documenting other statements).
464 See, e.g., 163 CONG. REC. H328 (daily ed. Jan. 11, 2017) (statement of Rep. McCarthy).
457
458
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sional intent and provides for deference under step two only when
those tools fail to yield a clear answer. Also, as noted above, many
statutes contemplate that agencies will exercise discretion to fill statutory gaps—sometimes explicitly, for example by expressly calling
upon agencies to develop regulations to resolve a particular issue;
other times implicitly, for example by using vague or undefined terms
and separately authorizing agencies to adopt regulations as needed.465
Specific statutes trump the more general APA.466 Consequently, a reviewing court might reasonably interpret a specific statutory grant of
discretionary authority—for example to adopt regulations or pursue
formal adjudication to elaborate and implement undefined or underdefined statutory terms—as taking precedence over a general call
for de novo review contained in the APA. Thus, a reviewing court
might reasonably conclude that SOPRA’s reference to de novo review
does not preclude judicial deference in all cases, but rather merely
limits the scope of when the court ought to honor the agency’s
choices. If such is the case, then it is difficult to see what exactly
SOPRA’s call for de novo review accomplishes that cannot be reconciled with Chevron and Mead.
Perhaps recognizing these limitations, a lengthier SOPRA incorporated into the House version of the RAA goes even further by
specifying:
If the reviewing court determines that a statutory or regulatory provision relevant to its decision contains a gap or ambiguity, the court shall not interpret that gap or ambiguity as
an implicit delegation to the agency of legislative rule making authority and shall not rely on such gap or ambiguity as a
justification either for interpreting agency authority expansively or for deferring to the agency’s interpretation on the
question of law.467
Presumably, this language is intended to undermine Chevron’s instruction that courts should defer when faced with ambiguous statutes.
By instructing courts not to read statutory ambiguities as delegations
of legislative rulemaking power, this language also raises the specter
of some very old notions regarding different types of statutory grants
of rulemaking power. In doing so, the revised SOPRA may generate
more questions and create more uncertainty than it resolves.
See supra notes 401–16 and accompanying text.
Cf. Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 384 (1992) (“[I]t is a commonplace of statutory construction that the specific governs the general . . . .”).
467 Regulatory Accountability Act of 2017, H.R. 5, 115th Cong. § 202(1)(B) (2017).
465
466

R

\\jciprod01\productn\G\GWN\85-5\GWN502.txt

2017]

unknown

Seq: 68

CHEVRON’S INEVITABILITY

14-NOV-17

9:57

1459

In the middle of the twentieth century, the consensus among
courts, agencies, and legal scholars held that agencies could only promulgate legally binding regulations when Congress specified statutorily what the content of those regulations should be.468 By contrast,
more general statutory grants of authority to adopt rules and regulations as needed were thought not to support legally binding regulations at all.469 In light of this distinction, prior to Chevron, courts
evaluated agency regulations adopted pursuant to specific grants of
rulemaking power merely for reasonableness but less authoritative,
general authority regulations using Skidmore’s arguably less deferential, multifactor analysis.470 One of Chevron’s innovations was to eliminate the old specific versus general authority distinction in the judicial
deference context.471 By implicitly distinguishing between specific and
general authority delegations of rulemaking power, does the revised
SOPRA contemplate a return to different standards of review for specific versus general authority regulations? If so, which ones—Chevron,
Skidmore, neither, or both?
Moreover, the added language addresses only the standard of review that courts should apply when evaluating agency legal interpretations. Meanwhile, other provisions of the RAA preserve a distinction
between legislative rules subject to notice-and-comment rulemaking
requirements and interpretative rules and policy statements exempt
from those procedures, without defining those categories.472 Since at
least the 1960s, courts have routinely treated regulations adopted pursuant to general grants of rulemaking authority as legislative rules carrying the force of law and, thus, as subject to notice-and-comment
rulemaking requirements.473 By implicitly distinguishing between specific and general delegations of rulemaking power, does the revised
SOPRA repeal the legal effect of fifty years of general authority regulations treated as legislative rules by agencies, courts, and regulated
parties alike? Do all of those regulations suddenly become interpretative rules, subject to change without further notice and opportunity
468 See Hickman, supra note 50, at 1564–67 (documenting pre-Chevron historical understandings regarding different types of statutory rulemaking authority).
469 Id.
470 See id. at 1568–73 (relating deference doctrine to scholarly and judicial understandings
of specific versus general delegations of rulemaking power in the decades prior to the Chevron
decision).
471 See Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 562 U.S. 44, 56–57
(2011) (acknowledging that Chevron eliminated that distinction).
472 H.R. 5 § 103(b) (amending APA section 553 rulemaking procedures but retaining the
exceptions from most procedural requirements for interpretative rules and policy statements).
473 Hickman, supra note 50, at 1574–75.
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for comment? And if so, then what happens if Congress downgrades
thousands of regulations governing primary behavior and extending
government benefits from binding law to mere nonbinding agency
advice?
In short, although intended to overturn Chevron, neither version
of SOPRA is altogether clear as to its meaning or its scope. Additionally, the revised SOPRA contained in the House version of the RAA
is arguably inconsistent with other provisions of that legislation and, if
adopted, could be enormously destabilizing for those who depend
upon consistency in the laws that govern their legal rights, obligations,
and interests. Perhaps for these reasons, the version of the RAA presently making its way through the Senate contains none of SOPRA’s
language and does not seek otherwise to repudiate Chevron or limit
its scope.474
Regardless, whatever amendment to the APA Congress might
fashion and adopt, merely telling courts to decide cases for themselves
and not read too much into statutory gaps is unlikely to eliminate judicial deference to agency interpretations of law. When faced with two
competing, seemingly reasonable interpretations of a statute, and
when traditional tools of statutory construction fail to provide a clear
answer, many judges will be inclined simply to side with the agency
charged by Congress with administering the statute. With Chevron
deference as an option, courts finding themselves in such a scenario
are free to say so as the basis for their decision. Without that alternative, courts in such circumstances may very well still side with the
agency but with less transparency, justifying their decisions using
whatever interpretive tools the agency suggested in its brief—even if
that reasoning did not persuade the court that the agency’s interpretation really was superior. Such disingenuousness in judicial decisionmaking hardly seems like an improvement over the status quo.
In the end, the only way for Congress to really “repeal” Chevron
sensibly and effectively is statute by statute, and perhaps even provision by provision, disclaiming the use of Chevron where Congress intends the agency to have no major policymaking role, and clarifying
statutory language where Congress disagrees with the administering
agency’s interpretation thereof. That outcome seems almost as unlikely on a grand scale as Congress ceasing its reliance on delegating
policymaking discretion in the first instance.

474

Regulatory Accountability Act of 2017, S. 951, 115th Cong. (2017).
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CONCLUSION
Reports of Chevron’s demise are greatly exaggerated, and efforts
to overturn Chevron aim at the wrong target. Certainly, Chevron is a
highly imperfect doctrine. The opinion itself is confusing. Courts are
inconsistent when they apply it, adding to the confusion. Legitimate
questions abound regarding Chevron’s proper scope and operation.
Undoubtedly, there remains room for improvement and clarification.
Yet, casting Chevron as administrative law’s bogeyman has always been a bit overwrought. Chevron undoubtedly is not what the
Framers had in mind, but then again, neither is the modern regulatory
state. So long as agency officials possess the authority to make major
policy decisions, Chevron—or something much like it—will survive.
Congress will continue delegating, so courts will continue deferring in
some number of cases. To the extent that courts and commentators
want to curtail the administrative state, they should focus their efforts
on rolling back congressional delegations of policymaking discretion
to agency officials rather than overturning Chevron.
In short, Chevron’s basic premises represent a reasonable judicial
response to the government that we actually have and the world in
which we actually live. To paraphrase Winston Churchill, Chevron is
the worst standard of review, except for all the others.475

475 CHURCHILL BY HIMSELF: THE DEFINITIVE COLLECTION OF QUOTATIONS 573 (Richard
M. Langworth ed., 2008) (quoting speech to the House of Commons on November 11, 1947:
“[D]emocracy is the worst form of Government except for all those other forms that have been
tried from time to time . . . .” (alteration in original)).

